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The relations between facts and values in the writing of historical geography need to be mutual and
reinforcing. I  explore this point by examining the work of a group of historians who have
foregrounded the relations between facts and values. These New Western Historians take up themes
such as social justice, regionalism, and environmentalism that have been central to the concerns
of historical geographers, but they are more explicit than many historical geographers about both
the political motivations behind the questions they ask and their choice of subjects to study. I
consider the work of two historians, William Cronon and Donald Worster, who have made
environmentalism the core of their historical writing, and two others, Richard White and Patricia
Limerick, for whom questions of social justice inform historical interpretation. I conclude by
exploring how attention to the interplay between facts and values might rekindle the utopian
dimension of explicitly political historical geographies. Key Words: environmentalism, New Western
History, social justice.
The New Western History is a recent devel-opment that has garnered a wide audiencefor academic history by reexamining the
crucial importance of the West to the political
identity of the U.S. Under its inspiration, public
exhibitions such as the Smithsonian’s “The
West as America”  (Washington, DC, 1991),
have questioned the central myth of the fron-
tier as the place where civilization overcame
savagery. This exhibition drove one Senator to
bewail the Smithsonian’s sponsorship of “per-
verted history.” As Hughes (1994:161) re-
marked, “[s]tarting with Daniel Boorstin, the
former Librarian of Congress, a whole crowd of
politicos and right-wing columnists put on their
boots and started kicking.”
The central myth the exhibition questioned is
inherently historical and geographical. It finds, as
a source of the values and energy of the U.S., the
process of colonization, whereby so-called
“empty” space was gradually incorporated into
the new republic. The “New Western History” (so
termed by historian Patricia Limerick) accuses
the mythmakers of downplaying environmental
destruction, injustices to native peoples, and the
race, class, and gender conflicts at the heart of the
imperialist process of taking the land for the new,
big country. To point toward how a new historical
geography of the West might attend to a new
series of political agendas arising out of the New
Western History, this paper examines the work of
contemporary historians William Cronon, Don-
ald Worster, Richard White, and Limerick.
The New Western History takes up issues that
are major concerns of human geography, such as
regionalism (Morris 1994; Thrift 1994), environ-
mentalism  (Williams  1994),  and social justice
(Smith 1994; Harvey 1996). These issues, then,
are not new to human geography, or even to work
on the historical geography of the U.S. Carl Sauer
(1956) posed questions about the environmental
destruction entailed by the industrial civilization
that displaced  Native American peoples  from
most of the continent. Richard Jackson (1981)
has described the politics of land-use regulation.
Donald Meinig (1986, 1993) has put the creation
of regional diversity and its political implications
at the core of his account of the shaping of North
America and, furthermore, has not shrunk from
describing the violent taking of the land as “im-
perialism.” The New Western History also coa-
lesces with some of the most interesting recent
historical-geographical scholarship on North
America, such as Nostrand (1992) on the U.S.-
Mexico borderlands and Wishart (1994) on the
fate of the native peoples of Nebraska. A special
issue of Ecumene (5[1], 1998) is devoted to the
discussion of some of the relations between geog-
raphy and the New Western History. At least one
of the historians I discuss has engaged in debate
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with geographers. In the pages of Antipode, Wil-
liam Cronon has been attacked for being insuf-
ficiently marxist, while in the Journal of Historical
Geography, he has been taken to task as insuffi-
ciently postmodernist.1 These two sets of criticisms
focus in rather different ways on the question of
the relations between facts and values that is at
the heart of this paper. Yet there is something
distinctive about the explicitly political nature of
the historical agenda in the New Western History
that has rarely been confronted in human geog-
raphy. Geographers have been more willing to
note the inevitability of personal bias and interest
in the selection of subjects for study (Wishart
1997) than to subject their substantive, theoreti-
cal, and methodological choices to explicitly po-
litical or moral review.
The New Western History takes cognizance of
the broadening horizons of social history as the
latter engages with under-researched areas such
as race and gender. These topics have, in large
part, forced their way onto the academic agenda
by virtue of the political visibility and self-
confidence of the new social movements that
campaigned on behalf of their political salience
in the 1960s and 1970s. The  supposed value
neutrality of historical scholarship has been fa-
tally wounded by the development of social his-
tory engagé (Novick 1988; Nash et al. 1997),
opening up the prospect of two-way traffic be-
tween political and historical scholarship (Scott
1988).
Geographers have much to learn from debates
within history, and historical geographers have
certainly kept abreast of the flourishing field of
social history. Race and gender, for example, are
topics to which Jeanne Kay has previously drawn
the attention of  historical  geographers  (1989,
1990, 1991). Yet when social historians explicitly
address the study of the past to the concerns of
the present, few historical geographers have fol-
lowed with enthusiasm. In the New Western His-
tory, the values of historians past and present
become an explicit part of the study. Because a
mythology of the West is such an important part
of the self-consciousness of the people of the U.S.,
this questioning of values has been contentious.
Making the Circle Virtuous
The frontier has been the central feature of the
historiographical and  mythological connection
between landscape and identity in the U.S. In
Gunfighter Nation, Slotkin charts the continual
reworking of the frontier myth in American poli-
tics and culture during this century. According to
Slotkin, the prevailing version  of the  frontier
thesis has not been that of Frederick Jackson
Turner, but of U.S. President Theodore
Roosevelt.2 While Turner stressed the impor-
tance of democratic processes in frontier farming
communities, Roosevelt emphasized the earlier
stage of the hunter securing space against “sav-
agery.” It is Roosevelt’s account of the origin of
truly American values that has held sway in the
political culture of the U.S.: a legacy of conquest,
race-war, and colonialism. Slotkin writes:
“[w]hile Turner locates the crucial dynamism in
a democratic collectivity, Roosevelt locates it in
a successive class of heroes emerging from the
strife of races to earn a neo-aristocratic right to
rule” (1992:35). There are, then, different values
and conceptions of the good polity, and different
stories are available to support them. Slotkin’s
analysis highlights these tangled but important
connections between description and prescrip-
tion, between is and ought; his work thus raises
the complex question of the place of values in
scholarly inquiry.
Most scholars today would agree that theoreti-
cal categories are imbued with normative con-
cerns. My interest is in making the circle between
facts and values a virtuous one. In other words,
what we learn about the world should inform our
choice of appropriate political and moral stances.
Beyond the most basic of commitments, moral
and political questions frequently rest on certain
claims about how the world (or society) works.
Similarly, we need to set up theoretical categories
so that we can draw ethically relevant conclu-
sions from our studies. As Hirst (1990) has ar-
gued, blanket charges of relativism or objectivism
can help us little here, for neither position is
defensible or operationalizable. Where two ac-
counts of the same aspect of social reality are in
empirical contradiction, it will not do to defend
their incompatibility on the grounds of political
or theoretical pluralism, nor will it do to resolve
the contradiction by appealing to one’s affinity
with the theoretical or empirical position of either
writer of those accounts. Doing so places political
and theoretical concerns beyond empirical em-
barrassment. Unless our politics and theory are
vulnerable when they engage with the empirical
world, they can have little purchase on that
world. The relativist might claim that empirical
work  cannot decide moral  issues,  and  thus a
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plurality of political and theoretical positions
must be allowed. Yet to claim that empirical work
has nothing to contribute to the evaluation of
political strategy is to sever the link between
utopia and  reality in a  way that is politically
dangerous and contradicted by the evident em-
beddedness of all political movements, including
new social movements. That embeddedness
should be a matter of reflection, not denial. On
the other hand, for the objectivist to suggest that
one’s moral outlook should not dictate one’s sub-
stantive work is also a dogmatic evasion of the
dialectical interplay with which we are concerned
here. I agree that empirical work cannot be
judged on the basis of the political or moral sign
under which it has been written. Something is not
to be judged as true or false simply because we
agree or disagree with the political spin the writer
places upon the study or even  with the  spin
which, in a spirit of “hermeneutical suspicion”
(Jones 1988:192), we imagine the writer incites
us to place upon the study. It would, however, be
impossible to sustain the claim that intellectual
agendas are not shaped by theoretical preconcep-
tions. There is a middle ground between objectiv-
ism and relativism where facts and values meet,
mingle, and mutually reinforce or contradict one
another. We need to negotiate the middle ground,
and it is here that the New Western History offers
some instructive examples of a virtuous circle of
facts and figures (see Figure 1).
The Vanguard
In this essay, I examine the relations between
normative and empirical concerns in the work of
perhaps the four most prominent of the New
Western Historians, “the vanguard” (Shoemaker
1996:10): Cronon, Worster, White, and Limer-
ick. By explicating the moral concerns of their
work, I intend to further explain how their nar-
ratives are structured and thus open a critique
that shuttles between facts and values, examining
their necessary interdependence. The vanguard
New Western Historians, by engaging with the
political purposes of environmental history, ex-
emplify the interdependence between facts and
values in ways that are directly relevant to
geography.
Each of  these historians  is  concerned with
environmental history in one form or another.
Cronon and Worster may be paired as concerned
with the politics of nature, while White and Lim-
erick are both concerned with the nature of poli-
tics itself. I begin my analysis by examining
Figure 1. The virtuous circle of facts and values.
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Cronon’s differences with marxism, showing that
divergent political concerns produce narratives
with contrasting emphases. Marx’s labor theory
of value is normative in much the same way as
Cronon’s natural theory of value. Both embody
empirical claims about the world, which in turn
inform political choices. There are both empirical
and political contrasts between Cronon and
Marx. I am unwilling to dismiss Cronon as “ideo-
logical” and “wrong” simply because he is non-
marxist and thus “unscientific.” I am also denying
myself the comfort of simply celebrating the di-
versity of perspectives and stories. I argue that
there are real differences of substance between
the explanations that Cronon and Marx offer of
the central dynamic of the colonial American
economy. There are conflicting factual claims in
their work that I will highlight but not claim to
resolve.
I then turn to the conceptions of nature,
science, and capitalism in the work of Worster,
who is likewise concerned to establish his dis-
tance from marxism. I argue that his work is
based on an unhelpful demonization of tech-
nology and a poorly explored vision of an alter-
native plausible present that we might
conceivably inhabit. Again, I argue that there
are both empirical and political claims at stake
here and that we can meaningfully examine
their interrelations.
Although, like Cronon and Worster, White
and Limerick have written what might be termed
environmental histories, their political concerns
are less  well defined  as  “green.” Over time,
White has become more explicitly concerned
with questions of justice, while Limerick has
increasingly focused on issues of regionalism
and citizenship. White is acutely aware of the
dialectic between facts and values, although in
drawing attention to the provisional nature of
the first and the multiplicity of the second, he
is keen to  avoid  subordinating his empirical
studies to the advocacy of any particular politi-
cal position. Nevertheless, there is some merit
in making the interconnections between facts
and values a central feature in evaluating his
work. His use of the metaphor of the “middle
ground” invites this sort of framing of his exem-
plary narratives.
Where White is reticent, or at best guarded,
about making specific connections between nor-
mative and empirical concerns, Limerick is clear
and unambiguous. She wants both to sustain a
distinct regional consciousness in the Southwest
U.S. and to claim for it a heightened awareness of
the multiple claims to citizenship that the history
of the region allows its diverse residents. This
attention to the specificities of a particular region
means that, for her, the West is most definitely a
place rather than a process. In this, Limerick
stands apart from the way Cronon treats the West.
For Cronon, the West is a term to describe the
incorporation of new territories into the emerging
federal U.S. The claims of process treat the whole
of the  U.S. as  a relevant, if changing, spatial
entity. In this way, Cronon can even present the
study of colonial New England as part of the same
frontier story.3 For Limerick, as we will see below,
this residual frontierism in Cronon bespeaks a
geographical bias that treats American history as
having one privileged trajectory, that from the
east coast to the west. Instead, she claims only to
be able to understand the multiculturalism of the
Southwest U.S. by giving equal attention to His-
panic movements  from the  south  and Native
American displacements to the north, as well as
to the traditional frontier movement from the
east. In her attention to the Southwest as a dis-
tinctive place, she is particularly interested in the
ways that engaged art can both express historical
lessons and enliven regional consciousness. A
concept of citizenship serves as a yardstick, allow-
ing these lessons to be drawn in her own historical
writing.
Norms and Utopias
Finally, I conclude by connecting the world of
facts and values around the realms of norms and
utopias. The connections across this pair of po-
larities inflect each other. We judge the past be-
cause we think it helps us to make the case that
things might be different in the present. There
would be no point judging the past were the
course of history inevitable, fully determined, or
located only in the past. Thus there is a connec-
tion between a belief in plausible worlds for the
future and the exploration of counterfactuals in
history. This is the form that historical lessons
often take. Furthermore, our belief in possible
alternative presents and futures informs our po-
litical commitments and attendant strategies
(Hawthorn 1991). Yet such  strategic thinking
rests upon the feasibility of the alternatives we
propose. Historical work is one way of exploring
questions of feasibility. Because we think we
understand why various options were closed
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down in the past, we achieve some sense of the
difficulties that might attend their pursuit in the
present. These are not the only ways that political
thought can be advanced, but they remain useful
ones. Stories about space, environment, and
regions are central to many aspects of political
identity and manifest destiny—which is to say
that geographical  imaginations shape political
ones. This is a dialectic to which the New Western
History directs our  attention, and it is quite
proper that we should attend to it.
Theories of Value
William Cronon is an environmental historian
with strong connections to geography. Among
other things, he holds a joint appointment in
history, geography, and environmental studies at
the University of Wisconsin-Madison and is on
the editorial board of the Journal of Historical
Geography. His two monographs, Changes in the
Land and Nature’s Metropolis, concern, respec-
tively, the transformation of the environments of
colonial New England and of the hinterland of
nineteenth-century Chicago. Both books are
concerned with the frontier process that has been
so important to the U.S. experience. He has writ-
ten extensively on environmentalism, conserva-
tion, and the idea of the West as a process rather
than exclusively a place.
The Commodification of Nature
In all sorts of ways, Cronon’s work displays a
friendly respect for marxist scholarship. Indeed,
many of his central categories sound very marx-
ist: capital, exploitation, value, and commod-
ity, to name a few. Changes in the Land is, among
other things, an account of primitive accumu-
lation in New England. Nature’s Metropolis is,
again among many other things, an examina-
tion of the cultural consequences of the com-
modification of nature. I want to begin, however,
by establishing as irreducible and legitimate the
different strategies between Cronon and Marx,
after which I will explore the terms on which the
two frameworks may be usefully brought to en-
gage one another. Marx’s politics aimed at the
liberation of labor, whereas Cronon develops a
politics based on the central importance of na-
ture. Marx subscribed to a labor theory of value,
whereas Cronon is committed to a natural theory
of value.
For Cronon, people’s relations with nature
are dramatically reorganized through com-
modification:
The net result [of the commodification of nature]
was to redefine the resources of the Alaskan land-
scape, pushing them beyond the needs of local sub-
sistence into the realm of the market, where any
good could be transformed into any other. At the
same time the act of economic consumption came
to be increasingly separated from the place of eco-
logical production, distancing people from the con-
sequences of their own acts and desires. A kind of
alienation from nature was the inevitable result
(1992b:39).
It is this alienation from nature that allows people
to consume nature without paying any heed to
environmental consequences. For Cronon, this is
a pressing concern: “[l]ike other environmental-
ists, I am troubled by the many ways in which
people alienate themselves from the natural
world on which their lives depend” (1994a:169).
Such a reading of alienation is related to but not
quite the same as that of Marx, who described
how the commodification of labor power alienated
workers from the products of their labors, which
now confronted them as autonomous commodi-
ties owned by others:
[T]he worker is related to the product of his labor as
to an alien object. . . . The worker places his life in
the object [the commodity]; but now it [his life] no
longer belongs to him, but to the object. . . . The
externalization of the worker in his product means
not only that his labor becomes an object, an external
existence, but that it exists outside him, inde-
pendently of him and alien to him, and begins to
confront him as an autonomous power; . . . the life
. . . bestowed on the object confronts him as hostile
and alien (1975[1844]:324).
For Marx, capital is a social relation of produc-
tion rather than a physical factor of production.
Given a social arrangement where the means of
production are privately owned as property by
capitalists, while human work to produce goods
is done by the propertyless, capital is the where-
withal  for employing wage  labor. Because  the
commodities the laborer produces belong to the
capitalist, the process of production not only re-
sults in the alienation of the worker; it also repro-
duces the social relations of the propertied and
the propertyless:
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Since the process of production is also the process
of the consumption of labor-power by the capitalist,
the worker’s product is not only constantly con-
verted into commodities, but also into capital, i.e.,
into value that sucks up the worker’s value-creating
power, means of subsistence that actually purchase
human beings, and means of production that em-
ploy the people who are doing the producing. There-
fore the worker himself constantly produces
objective wealth, in the form of capital, an alien
power that dominates and exploits him; and the
capitalist just as constantly produces labor-power, in
the form of a subjective source of wealth which is
abstract, exists merely in the physical body of the
worker, and is separated from its own means of
objectification and realization; in short, the capital-
ist produces the worker as a wage-laborer
(1976[1867]:716).
Furthermore, for Marx, “value” is the form of
worth of a commodity in relation to other com-
modities, what it can be exchanged for in mone-
tary terms. This is in contrast to its “natural form,”
what it can be used for (1976[1867]:138). The
difference between what the inputs to the pro-
duction process can be exchanged for and what
the outputs from the production process can be
exchanged for is the value-added in production.
This value added by work is the value of labor. It
equals the wages paid to the worker (which are
used to meet the worker’s subsistence needs, to
reproduce the worker’s capacity for labor, also
known as variable capital or the exchange value
of labor  power)  plus the  surplus  value  which
accrues to the capitalist (pp. 320–29). Given a
circumstance in which  production  rests upon
capitalist relations, the source of value, then, is
labor. This is what the value form, as opposed to
the natural form, is measuring. The value of the
material inputs to the production process, then,
equals the labor embodied in their earlier produc-
tion, the value of dead labor.
For Cronon, however, capital takes on a dis-
tinctly green hue. In Nature’s Metropolis, he writes
that Chicago’s growth rested upon the exploita-
tion of the natural abundance of the prairie. He
concludes that: “[m]uch of the capital that made
the city was nature’s own” (1991:150–51). This,
he tells us, is where value comes from. Cronon
also remarks that, from an ecological point of
view, Marx’s relations of production might better
be seen as “relations of consumption, since all
human labor consumes ecosystemic energy flows
in the process of performing physiological and
mechanical work” (1990:1124; emphasis in origi-
nal). Production, then, rests on a set of nonhu-
man energies and resources that  have value.
Cronon concludes that we “have to assign a much
larger role to nature in the creation of such use
value” (1990:1125).
This belief shares similarities with but is differ-
ent from Marx’s formulation. In taking issue with
Marx, Cronon is asserting one normative concep-
tion of value against another: alienation from
nature, not alienation of labor; natural capital,
not capital as dead labor; a natural theory of
value, not a labor theory of value. Furthermore,
Cronon is quite explicit about the need for history
to articulate such normative concerns, suggesting
that “[i]t is because we care about the conse-
quences of action that narratives—unlike most
natural processes—have beginnings, middles,
and ends” and that “[t]he difference between
beginning and end gives us our chance to extract
a moral from the rhetorical landscape. Our nar-
ratives take changes in the land and situate them
in stories whose endings become the lessons we
wish to draw from those changes” (1992c:1370).
It is no real answer to Cronon simply to show
that all the points he makes are recoverable
within the orthodox marxist account, by, for
example, arguing that using up the natural
abundance of the prairie might be understood
through the concept of differential rent and its
determinat ion by soi l fert i l i ty (Marx
1974a[1894]:650–68). Nor is it enough to show
that Marx drew a distinction between value and
use value (1976[1867]:163–68) that precisely
captures Cronon’s distinction between labor and
nature. Cronon and Marx provide parallel
though compatible accounts based on parallel but
irreducible  value  orientations. Marx  was con-
cerned with a utopia in which the control of labor
power would be taken from the capitalist and
returned to the worker: “[l]et us . . . imagine, for
a change, an association of free men, working
with the means of production held in common,
and expending their many different forms of
labor-power in full self-awareness as one single
social labor force” (1976[1867]:171). It is this
vision, the possibility of which Marx saw as im-
manent in contemporary social trends (and thus
as a plausible utopia), that shaped Marx’s indict-
ment of  the capitalist relations of production
under which his laboring contemporaries were
starved, broken, humiliated, and reduced.4
Cronon is likewise focused upon a better world,
one where ecological sustainability and respect
for all life, human and nonhuman, is paramount.
His vision rests upon a sense of place, a commit-
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ment  to  the  local world as our  home, and  a
recognition that we are engaged in a continuous
dialogue with the earth we live in: “[h]owever we
come to our love of the land . . . the important
thing is that we learn to care for it as more than
an abstraction. . . . The great challenge we face is
to do right by the land we have made our own”
(1990–1991:103). To draw attention to the im-
perative to respect nature, Cronon organizes his
work around a theory that valorizes nature in the
present.
Cronon and Marx thus  offer  two different
analyses of society’s central problems, different
agendas for change,  and different theories of
value. The natural theory of value in Cronon’s
work demands an intellectual engagement with
society’s central problems and not just the asser-
tion of a purer marxist alternative (pace Merchant
1994; Pudup 1994; Page and Walker 1994; Saun-
ders  and Marston 1994, see  below). In other
words, even if the labor theory of value can save the
phenomena Cronon highlights, it does not follow
that marxist theory is thereby vindicated. Given
the irreducibly normative content to what we find
interesting about the world, it should be clear that
I cannot agree with those who bemoan the fact
that Nature’s Metropolis does “not quite add up to
a general analysis of the spatial and ecological
effects of nineteenth-century capitalism in a vast,
inviting tract of the New World where, through
much of a century, capitalism held a particular
sway” (Harris 1994:123). The dream of a politique
totale is as chimerical as that of an histoire totale. I
cannot agree with those who assert the theoreti-
cal priority of issues of labor over those of ecology
by invoking the fact that “[f]or Marx, labor and
nature are ‘identical expressions’ such that the
exploitation of labor (human property) is insepa-
rable from the exploitation of nature” (Saunders
and Marston 1994:127). Merchant’s observa-
tions are more on target: “[b]y bracketing the
relations of production, Cronon’s critique of the
market is limited to its ecological costs. . . . [T]he
ultimate outcome of the bracketing of the rela-
tions of production . . . is an embracement of
green capitalism. The main conclusion that we as
readers are left to draw is an implied admonition
that the commodification of nature must some-
how be made environmentally sound” (Merchant
1994:137). On grounds of both political strategy
and empirical adequacy, there may be reasons to
contest the particular focus of Nature’s Metropolis,
but it can hardly be done in the name of some
other all-encompassing position.5 It is difficult to
avoid Cronon’s exasperation:
All narratives are partial. All succeed by ignoring
vast stretches of reality. All distort the world with
their selectivity. There are no genuinely totalizing
narratives, just narratives that deceive their readers
and listeners into believing they are such
(1994a:172).
Nor can we avoid his claim that you might easily
substitute “theory” for “narrative” in the above
quotation.6
Marx and Cronon on Primitive
Accumulation
I recognize that the different normative con-
cerns of Marx and Cronon frame different ways
of looking at the world. Different things are val-
ued and brought into focus. Here I turn briefly to
the engagement with marxism in Cronon’s earlier
Changes in the Land. One thing this book offers is
an account of ecological transformations of New
England by European farmers. Here Cronon ar-
gues that “economic and ecological imperialisms
reinforced each other” (1983:162), resulting in
environmental degradation. As the New England
farming economy moved from a seventeenth-
century  subsistence base to a  market-driven
nineteenth-century system  in which resources
were treated as commodities rather than as pro-
viding subsistence (p. 76), the effects on nature
became more marked. These, in turn, reacted
upon the economy: “[e]cological pressures
brought on by overgrazing and inadequate forage
reinforced economic incentives flowing more di-
rectly from market demand: together, the two
impelled colonial movement onto  new  lands”
(p. 162). This might appear, once again, to be
little more than Cronon insisting on the impor-
tance of ecology to supplement alternative ac-
counts that focus simply on labor. At points,
Cronon suggests as much:
[n]ot only colonial agriculture, but lumbering and
the fur trade as well, were able to ignore the problem
of continuous yield because of the temporary gift of
nature which fueled their continuous expansion.
When that gift was finally exhausted, ecosystems
and economies alike were forced into new relation-
ships: expansion could not continue indefinitely
(p. 169).
Yet Cronon has an economic explanation for this
attitude toward nature. He argues that New En-
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gland was an economy in which labor and capital
were scarce and land was substituted for both:
“[l]and in New England became for the colonists
a form of capital, a thing consumed for the express
purpose of creating augmented wealth” (p. 169).
It appears here that attitudes toward nature are
being explained by way of a neoclassical account
of the economy in terms of the return to immo-
bile, inconvertible factors of production. Yet,
within such a neoclassical framework, if capital
was scarce, why did not the rate of interest rise to
the point at which funds would have left the
European economy and been invested in New
England? If labor was scarce, why did not wages
at the frontier swell to the point where labor
would have been lured away from European town
and country? The answer is, of course, that per-
fect mobility of factors of production is a highly
unrealistic assumption for colonial New England.
This recognition highlights the institutional and
material setting of production that rarely surfaces
in neoclassical accounts. Even within that neo-
classical framework, capital and labor scarcity
might as easily be explained in terms of the low
price of land that encouraged an extensive system
of production. But that price, in turn, reflected a
political situation in which resources could be
taken from Native Americans at little cost to the
settlers themselves, returning us once again to the
material and institutional context. The costs of
setting up this sort of farming economy were
borne in large part by the government as a military
expenditure. Writing of the settling of the Ohio
Valley, Aron notes that between 1790 and 1796,
eighty percent of the federal budget of the U.S.
was spent on war with the Native Americans of
Ohio (1994:139).
In contrast to neoclassical economics, Marx
was very interested in the institutional setting of
what he termed capitalist relations of production.
Instead of factors of production, he directs atten-
tion toward the political and social preconditions
of the appearance of “things” as factors. It is in
this sense that one may speak of Cronon’s
Changes  in the Land as being about primitive
accumulation—the process whereby these pre-
conditions are realized. Without them, inde-
pendent, subsistence farming is the more likely
arrangement. Marx described how Edward Wake-
field’s studies of colonization led Wakefield to an
appreciation of the social prerequisites for the
existence of capital:
Wakefield discovered that, in the colonies, property
in money, means of subsistence, machines and other
means of production does not as yet stamp a man as
a capitalist if the essential complement to these
things is missing: the wage-laborer, the other man,
who is compelled to sell himself of his own free will.
He discovered that capital is not a thing, but a social
relation between persons which is mediated through
things. A Mr. Peel, he complains, took with him from
England to the Swan River district of Western Aus-
tralia means of subsistence and of production to the
amount of £50,000. This Mr. Peel even had the
foresight to bring besides, 3,000 persons of the work-
ing class, men, women and children. Once he ar-
rived at his destination, “Mr. Peel was left without a
servant to make his bed or fetch him water from the
river.” Unhappy Mr. Peel, who provided for every-
thing except the export of English relations of pro-
duction to Swan River! (1976[1867]:932–33).
Marx went on to offer an explanation of these
colonial conditions different from that of Cronon:
We have seen that the expropriation of the mass of
the people from the soil forms the basis of the
capitalist mode of production. The essence of a free
colony, on the contrary, consists in this, that the
bulk of the soil is still public property, and every
settler on it can therefore turn part of it into his
public property and his individual means of produc-
tion, without preventing later settlers from perform-
ing the same operation. This is the secret both of the
prosperity of the colonies and of their cancerous
affliction—their resistance to the establishment of
capital (1976[1867]:934).
This, it seems to me, is a more adequate ac-
count than one which takes the relative scarcity
of the different factors of production for granted.
It offers a description of how such a state of affairs
arose and, moreover, highlights the institutional
and geographical arrangements under which
matters would soon fall out differently. If Cronon
wanted to offer a neoclassical explanation of at-
titudes to nature, he would have done better to
focus on the price of land than the scarcity of
capital. But if he wanted to examine the links
between ecological and economic imperialism,
then Marx’s emphasis on capital as a social rela-
tion rather than a factor of production is more
adequate than an emphasis on scarcity of land or
capital.
What Cronon Adds to Marx
Before I leave this discussion of the relations
between green and marxist critiques of capital-
ism, I want to comment briefly on what Cronon
adds to Marx’s account. First, Cronon is correct
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to note that marxists pay relatively little attention
to the feedbacks from nature to society. In fact,
historical materialists generally display a disturb-
ing lack of interest in the organization of the
material basis of society, be it in terms of ecology,
demography, or communications (Kearns
1984b:416). The precise consequences of this will
vary from case to case, but in the case of colonial
New England, a failure to recognize the extent to
which the uses made of the land by early colonists
proved unsustainable would indeed compromise
any account of the dynamics of the agricultural
economy. Second, Cronon is also correct to prise
apart the effects of the proletarianization of labor
and of the commodification of nature in his ac-
count of the expansionary dynamic of capitalism.
Marx conflates the two in his analyses of agricul-
tural capitalism in volume 1 of Capital (1976
[1867]:chs. 26–33). Cronon describes a transi-
tion from a subsistence to a capitalist economy in
New England between the seventeenth and nine-
teenth centuries:
[m]ost early farmers owned their own land, hired
few wage laborers, and produced mainly for their
own use. Markets were hemmed in by municipal
regulations, high transportation costs, and medieval
notions of the just price. In none of these ways does
it seem reasonable to describe colonial New England
as “capitalist” (1983:76).
From the seventeenth century, resources began
to be seen increasingly as commodities:
Although an earlier English meaning of the word
“commodity” had referred simply to articles which
were “commodious” and hence useful to people . . .
that meaning was already becoming archaic by the
seventeenth century. In its place was the commodity
as an object of commerce, one by definition owned
for the sole purpose of being traded away at a profit
(p. 76).
Items such as fish, furs, and timber were increas-
ingly seen as commodities,
valued not for the immediate utility they brought
their possessors but for the price they would bring
when exchanged at market. In trying to explain
ecological changes related to these commodities, we
can safely point to market demand as the key causal
agent (p. 76).
It would appear that this market orientation is
independent of the existence of generalized wage
labor. In other words, capitalist forms of calcula-
tion and profit, and the production of commodi-
ties by commodities, can proceed on the basis of
owner-occupiers and can have dramatic ecologi-
cal consequences, even while the economy is not
yet organized on the basis of universal wage labor.
This view has implications for the account of
agrarian capitalism in Capital. Marx’s emphasis
on the subordination of labor to capital led him
to theorize the emergence of English agrarian
capitalism primarily in terms of the emergence of
agricultural wage labor during the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries. Yet, in terms of the
production of commodities by commodities and
the demonstrable effects that this had on patterns
of land use, there is no need to tie the emergence
of capitalist calculation in production to the
availability of wage labor.
This theoretical point has important implica-
tions for empirical, historical accounts. There has
been a tendency for marxist historians to illus-
trate Marx’s claims about the development of
agrarian capitalism rather than to consider the
central assumptions on which his argument
rested. In fact, in the history of English agricul-
ture, there was indeed a separation, historically,
between the widespread organization of farming
as the production of commodities by means of
commodities, and the emergence of wage labor as
the primary form of work in agriculture. Empiri-
cally, the former did not always imply the latter.
Tribe argues that:
Capitalism can be briefly summarized as a form of
economy in which consumption is separated from
production, enterprises are separated and in a state
of competition, and the national economy is co-
ordinated according to the profitability of the com-
modities sold by enterprises. . . . In principle, then,
the “capitalist farm” could be either a large farm in
which a farmer supervises wage-laborers, or a family
farm in which family labor is supervised by a house-
hold head: the absence of wage-labor does not mean
that a farm is non-capitalist (1981:38).
Cronon’s identification of the commodification of
nature as the prelude to the transformation of
nature by economic and ecological imperialism is
a more satisfying explanation than one which saw
the process of primitive accumulation as being
primarily one involving the commodification of
labor power. With time, the further development
of the productive forces in agriculture is incon-
ceivable without the exploitation of wage labor.
Given private ownership of land, the pursuit of
scale economies in the use of machinery and
other expensive inputs requires a large agricul-
tural proletariat. Given the technological ar-
rangements of  nineteenth-century  agriculture,
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for example, a point would be reached in devel-
oping the land productivity of agriculture where
wage labor would be an essential prerequisite.
This land-intensive option becomes unavoidable
once the supply of so-called “free” land is re-
stricted or when land values rise for some other
reason (for example, by reason of the competition
for the locations most accessible to market).
In some ways, then, the labor theory of value
and the natural theory of value imply not only
different political projects but also different sets
of empirical blindspots. When they are deployed
in the explanation of essentially similar phenom-
ena (in this case, the ecological consequences of
land-use practices in New England), we can
evaluate the effects of  these empirical  biases.
Cronon’s normative concerns look toward a bet-
ter world where people forge a meaningful rela-
tionship with the place in which they live,
allowing them to cherish its natural setting and
thus sustain its natural value. The bête noire of
his story of colonial New England, then, is the
attitude of colonial settlers to the land which he
sees as the result of its commodification. These
normative concerns bring certain issues into fo-
cus and leaves others in the shadows.7 Certain
facts are prioritized, and others are relegated. The
crediblity of Cronon’s vision of a better world
must rest to some extent on the adequacy of his
diagnosis of the causes of the environmental
problems he describes. If things did not turn out
the way he describes for the reasons he gives, then
we might wonder whether they would get better
if we worked for a society organized around the
values he espouses. Cronon prioritizes the de-
struction of natural value, species variety, and
numbers. For Cronon, commodification con-
founds the sustainability implicit in subsistence
economies.
Imperial Ecology and Capitalism
Over the past two decades, Donald Worster
has been one of the most influential environ-
mental historians in North America. His studies
in the history of environmental ideas have gained
an academic and popular audience. His two main
historical monographs have concerned the eco-
logical disasters of the Dust Bowl and the extrac-
tion of the waters of the Colorado for the benefit
of some of the people of California. Among the
New Western Historians, none has been more
explicit about the normative basis of their cate-
gories than Worster.8
In the case of Worster, we can trace the full
virtuous circle from  facts  to values  and back
again. Worster is opposed to the human domina-
tion of nature. He believes that being in harmony
with nature would promote a natural egalitarian-
ism and a form of social solidarity rooted in the
recognition of ecological interdependence. This
is the basis for his attack on the exploitation of
nature that he finds in what he terms, following
Wittfogel (1957), the hydraulic society of the
Western U.S. By a hydraulic society,  Worster
means one in which the taming of rivers provides
the central resource for agriculture and energy:
There is no freedom for nature itself, for natural
rivers as free-flowing entities with their own integ-
rity and order. . . . There is nothing harmonious,
nothing picturesque about the western world that
has developed beside the irrigation ditch. There is
little peace or tidiness or care, little sense of a rooted
community. There is no equitable sharing of pros-
perity (1985:4, 5).
He distances himself quite explicitly from marxism.
Criticizing Carey McWilliams’s (1971) “standard
leftist analysis” of the economy and society of
California, in which McWilliams highlighted the
inequality and exploitation intrinsic to a capitalist
order, Worster writes that McWilliams:
[F]ailed to make room for nature, either as a histori-
cal actor or as a moral issue. In that respect, leftists
were no different from capitalists, both standing for
the conquest of the natural world, and their visions
of the future tended to converge toward the same
technological utopianism. . . . His Marxist-like logic
tells McWilliams that  private  property, not  the
domination of nature, is the source of all abusive
power, and in agriculture, he assumes, private prop-
erty must mean private, concentrated land-
ownership . . . Put the new-fangled hydraulic society
under socialism, he suggests. Make nature obey the
dictates of collective ownership, and the West will
be set right. Power will then belong to all the people,
which is to say it will cease to be a social problem
(1985:231, 232).
For Worster, such suggestions are a pipe dream,
for domination over nature will always lead to the
inequitable domination of some people over oth-
ers, to ecological vandalism, and to a slight upon
the integrity of nature.
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The Arcadian View of Nature
Worster’s analysis is a cultural critique of sci-
ence and capitalism. On one hand, Worster criti-
cizes what he terms an imperialist attitude to
nature and, on the other, he rejects capitalism as
a basis for organizing economic priorities. For
Worster, the societies of Europe and North Amer-
ica are characterized by a fundamentally imperial
attitude toward nature (see Table 1). Nature is
seen as a mechanism to be adjusted for the short-
term productivity needs of society. The fullest
development of this view of nature is about three
hundred years old and provided the intellectual
roots of industrialization. There is an older, more
benign, view that Worster terms Arcadian. In
contrast to Judeo-Christian societies that treat
nature with technological arrogance, seeing the
natural world as little more than a mechanical
order, pagan, Arcadian views cultivate an atti-
tude of humble wonderment in the face of the
unity in diversity of our ecological home. For
Arcadians, nature means beauty and life, best
understood through natural history. It is not to be
understood, as it is by imperialists, as little more
than a set of resources to be mastered through
laboratory science. Arcadians take a romantic
rather than a positivistic view of nature and aim
at stability and conservation rather than at indus-
trialization and the maximum use of energy (as is
said to characterize the imperialists). Cronon
draws a helpful distinction between the narrative
forms through which Arcadians and imperialists
express their visions of nature. He detects tragedy
in the Arcadian view, a falling from grace, and he
notes the emphasis  on progress in imperialist
narratives. Worster dislikes imperialism with a
vengeance: “we have had enough of imperialism.
. . . In this age of deadly mushroom clouds and
other environmental poisons, I believe it is surely
time to develop a gentler, more self-effacing ethic
toward the earth” (1977:346). Alongside imperi-
alism, the second criminal in the dock is capital-
ism, defined as business attitudes,  “a  core of
values and assumptions,” and “an enduring
ethos” (1979:6).
For Worster, imperial ecology and capitalism
were responsible for the Dust Bowl (see Figure 2).
Both capitalism and imperialism promoted the
idea that nature had no limits. America’s eco-
nomic culture “never recognized any limits nor
restrained the appetite for gain” (1979:63), while
Americans’  “faith in the benignity of nature”
(p. 27), their belief that humanity “is a sovereign
creature, independent of the restraints that
plague other species” (p. 94), and their expecta-
tion that technological fixes could restore any
temporary loss of land productivity (p.179), to-
gether reinforced the idea of  an irrepressible
economy and a boundless natural bounty. But
disasters such as the Dust Bowl should “challenge
a society’s capacity to think” and “require it to
analyze and explain and learn from misfortune”
(p. 25). Yet the U.S. proved immune to ecological
education. Ameliorative government actions
such as those begun in 1933 by the Farm Credit
Administration (p. 124) and Agricultural Adjust-
ment Administration (p. 155) froze landholding
Table 1. Theories of Naturea
Arcadian Imperial
Spirituality Pagan Judeo-Christian
Attitude to nature Humble wonderment Technological arrogance
Conception of natural order Unity in diversity, Mechanism of detachable parts,
organic synthesis mechanical reductionism
Meaning of nature Beauty, life Productivity, resources
Route to understanding Natural history Laboratory science
Cultural forms Naturalism, romanticism Humanism, positivism
Practical implications Conservation Industrialization
Ecological yardstick “Climax” stability Trophic energy, efficiency
Narrative form for Tragedy Progress
describing modernization
(after Cronon 1992c)
aafter Worster 1977; Cronon 1992c.
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arrangements, preventing even that rearrange-
ment the market might have induced (pp. 25,
163), while the Soil Conservation Service sus-
tained the resumption of environmental vandal-
ism (p. 229). At no point did the government
“begin to touch the commercial mode of farming”
(p. 196). A capitalist ethic continued to prevail.
A Communitarian Vision
In  more  recent work, Worster has moved
beyond this attack on business values to articu-
late a communitarian vision of a decentralized
anarchist utopia (although, as far as I am aware
he has not discussed this specific political philoso-
phy in any detail). This value orientation informs
a normative conception of democracy and auton-
omy that presents big government and laissez
faire as the twin evils sustaining the imperial view
of nature. He has also subsequently introduced
sharper ecological  sensitivity into the  picture,
discussing both a pastoral mode of production, or
“cowboy ecology” (1992a), and a hydraulic mode
of production (1992b) in the western U.S. In the
pastoral mode of production, only local control
and entrenched traditions can solve the problem
of overgrazing:
The safest strategy over the long run appears to
be one that opens decisions about using the range
to as many people as possible. The most stable
systems of grazing have been those in which the
experience, knowledge and moral pressure of a
whole community guided the individual grazier
(1992a:51).
Neither laissez faire nor remote central govern-
ment succeeded in preventing overgrazing on the
Great Plains in the 1880s. Worster’s case is clear
and is readily subject to consideration both as a
political blueprint (can we get to anarchist com-
munitarianism  from here?)  and as  a plausible
counterfactual (were nucleated Alpine-style vil-
lages a realistic option on the sparsely populated
Great Plains?).
In his Dust Bowl, Worster scans the southern
plains for alternative ways of making a living on
the land. He believes that what is required is some
sort of ideological vaccination against the blan-
dishments of  capitalist,  modern society.  Only
when land ceases to be seen as a commodity, and
only when community is identified in some strong
sense with the land itself, can true ecological
adaptation develop:
When  both  the identity of self and community
become indistinguishable from that of the land and
its fabric of life, adaptation follows almost instinc-
tively. . . . This is genuine adaptation, and it implies
much more than shallow managerial skill. It comes
from having a sense of place, which is at once a
perception of what makes a piece of land function
as it does and a feeling of belonging to and sharing
in its uniqueness (1979:164).
This is suggestive rather than persuasive, since
instinctive adaptation remains unexplained.
Nevertheless, the exploration of once-existing
and perhaps even still-surviving alternatives is an
important way of bringing empirical concerns to
discussion of values. This is what Yeo recognized
when he wrote that:
z
Figure 2. The Dust Bowl (after Worster 1979).
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From a conservative point of view, one uninterested
in change or in history except as a ratification and
celebration of the present, attempts are always being
made to collapse “ways of life” into a single “society”
or “system.” And then the way is open to say that
the ways we meet, define, multiply or divide needs,
constitute a single “culture”—“our” way of life, the
system. . . . The function of so doing is to remove
from view ownership, power, struggle, interests. It is
to conceal alternative, latent potentials and
achievements, in the interests of existing, manifest
facts and ideologies. Above all, it is to devalue
memory and collectivization in history. Competi-
tion and struggle involve loss and defeat as well as
growth: presents involve running over unrealized
but partly surviving pasts and temporarily blocked
futures (1980:113).
In this sense, the most radical pages of Dust Bowl
may be the brief remarks upon the farming
successes of the Mennonites. Worster contrasts
the Mennonites and moral puritanism, both of
which he sees as forms of resistance to modern
capitalism that promised to build new relations
with the land in the hope of instinctive adapta-
tion. He is impressed with the Mennonites, who:
“[i]n their  communalism, their  stability,  their
careful husbandry, and their high degree of self-
sufficiency . . . presented some alternative an-
swers to the challenges of the Dust Bowl thirties”
(1979:174). On the other hand:
Nurtured by itself, a moral rigidity toward booze and
sexual freedom—and that was essentially all puri-
tanism here meant—was not equivalent to a genu-
ine indigenous cultural base. It contributed nothing
to environmental adaptation, nothing to a sense of
place. In fact, it worked to mask the extent to which
those things were lacking (p. 178).
Yet many other religious groups also failed to
establish viable farming communities. Worster
would presumably not be comfortable with the
observation that the Mennonites were simply
better farmers than the rest (White 1991b:434),
but these few brief pages do not really provide a
causal explanation of how religious ideas, a genu-
ine indigenous cultural base, and instinctive eco-
logical adaptation are related. For Bogue, the
crucial advantage of Mennonite communities
was not a different attitude to the land but, in-
stead, a strain of winter wheat they brought with
them to the U.S. from Russia (Bogue 1994:307).
Szasz and Szasz remark on the mutability of Men-
nonite institutions in the U.S., noting that, rather
than a response to the physical environment, it
was the more tolerant political and cultural envi-
ronment that encouraged many Mennonites to
forsake banding together in tight communities in
favor  of a more dispersed settlement pattern:
“Although some branches of Mennonites re-
tained the communal emphasis, the majority be-
came individual farmers” (1994:374).
Resisting the Hydraulic Society
In his few pages on the Mennonites, Worster
fails to deliver on his promise to draw persuasive
lessons from the historical study of alternatives to
modern capitalism. Neither does Worster begin
to explain how resisting the modern age might be
made attractive to Americans. Elsewhere he has
promised that “[a] stable rural society in equilib-
rium with the processes of nature cannot allow
much freedom or self-assertiveness to the individ-
ual” (1993b:66). He does not flinch from spelling
out the full implications of properly recognized
ecological constraints:
Of course, all those restraints put a ceiling on the
amount of private wealth that any one person in the
community can accumulate. They limit creativity.
They make rural life conservative and hidebound.
But they prevent most of the failures caused by
misjudgment, egotism, ignorance, ambition, experi-
mentation, excitement, and fantasy (p. 67).
Nevertheless, Worster’s use of history to explore
alternatives to imperial ecology is an intriguing
way to connect facts and values. In a recent paper,
Worster called for a history of adaptation to na-
ture rather than of its technological conquest:
[I]f nothing else [it saves] us from gloom and exces-
sive pessimism. We need new kinds of heroes, a new
appreciation of nature’s powers of recovery, and a
new sense of purpose in this region—all of which
means we need a new past, one with the struggle for
adaptation as its main narrative, one that regards
successful adaptation as a  kind  of  heroism too
(1992c:253).
It is in his account of the hydraulic society of
the Great West (another conquest narrative) that
Worster’s political values are most prominent.
Here he makes an explicit case that the drive to
dominate nature inevitably entails dominating
people (Harvey 1996). He employs Wittfogel’s
hydraulic civilization and Horkheimer and
Adorno’s instrumental reason to define a political
economy of science in which decentralized com-
munitarianism has no chance to survive, but yet
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stands out all the more starkly defined as the
utopian  alternative to  technology  gone mad
and nature laid to waste. This thumbnail sketch
does scant justice to the verve and panache of
Rivers of Empire. Nevertheless, I want to high-
light a few  of  the empirical  and  conceptual
difficulties to which this particular normative
framework gives rise.
First, the notion of ecological stability by which
the hydraulic empire is found wanting is problem-
atic. Worster notes the difference between Euro-
American and Native American attitudes to
nature, suggesting that the native peoples of the
Plains might have delivered the following lesson
to the early Euro-American settlers: “[f]irst con-
trol your numbers . . . then simplify your wants
and see the earth as everybody’s mother rather
than as  a  piece  of  property  to be  divided  by
competing individuals” (1979:80). But Worster
sees the ecological sustainability of Native Ameri-
can food demands as leaving so light an impress
upon the land that it was almost as if they were
not there at all. In a testy response to the claims
of Pyne, who, he said, wanted “to reduce all
environmental  history, preindustrial and post-
industrial alike, to a common pile of ashes”
(1990b:1143), Worster is impatient with the claim
that the American environment in the West had
been substantially altered before the arrival of
Euro-Americans: “Without bogging down in pe-
dantic wrangles over definitions, we can say that
before contact the native peoples were dwelling
on a largely undomesticated continent, wild or
nearly wild over much of its extent” (1993a:5).
Unless the environment was at climax stability
beforehand, the destructive impact of imperial-
ism would be difficult to register. As Willems-
Braun (1997) notes, this marginalizes native
peoples by placing them  at a traditional pole
outside the challenges and possibilities of moder-
nity, while also corralling them in village spaces
detached from a pristine nature too easily pre-
sented as a freely available suite of resources upon
which no prior claims have been made. But Wal-
ton is persuaded that Paiute Native Americans,
at least in Owens Valley, California, were practic-
ing irrigated agriculture (1992:14–15), and even
if Pyne exaggerates the effects of fire, it seems
easier to acknowledge the importance of fire than
to dismiss it altogether. Worster’s conclusion is
questionable: “After several thousand years of
[Native American] habitation, the [Great] val-
ley’s ecological order was still more or less intact”
(1985:8). Worster himself has noted the difficulty
ecologists now have with concepts of climax and
equilibrium (1977:241, 1993b), but the impor-
tance of these concepts to Rivers of Empire is clear.
Even if partly correct, Worster’s suspicion that
much of the attack on what he sees as ecological
verities is motivated by a right-wing Social Dar-
winist backlash against conservation offers little
security against the empirical arguments ad-
vanced.
The second problem with the analysis con-
cerns the lack of any serious attention to resis-
tance. Worster maintains that both localities and
nature are crushed by the juggernaut of big busi-
ness and big government. The only resistance he
can envisage comes from  Arcadian  ecologists
(subversive scientists and a modern, ecofriendly
public). Yet something like his Arcadianism has
been an enduring tradition in the American
Southwest, one built on an appreciation of Native
American myths and practices, in the tradition of
Thoreau. This tradition, as Rudnik describes it,
has been broadly feminist. It is a tradition that saw
in the region:
[A] New World whose terrain, climate and indige-
nous peoples offered a model of ecological, spiritual
and artistic integration to an alienated and decadent
Western civilization. [These women’s] perceptions
were rooted in their ideal of a multiethnic democ-
racy that recognized the long-ignored social, eco-
nomic and cultural contributions of women,
Hispanics and Indians to the life of the region and
the nation (Rudnik 1987:10).
The apparent resistance of the land to imperial-
ism echoed the resistance of women to patriarchy.
There is a tradition of resistance that runs from
Mary Austin to Patricia Limerick and that con-
tinues to nourish environmentalism and conser-
vation, as Merchant has recently reminded
Worster: “[T]he efforts of thousands of women
were directly responsible for many of the coun-
try’s most significant conservation achievements.
Women writers on nature such as Isabella Bird,
Mary Austin, and Rachel Carson have been
among the most influential commentators on the
American response to nature” (1990:1119).
Related to this failure to recognize feminist
resistance to imperialism (leaving his romantic
Arcadianism alone in the lists against capitalism)
is a simplistic notion of the relations between big
government and localities that underwrites a de-
spairing politics,  one that rejects  all  forms  of
government beyond mutual aid in the village.
Worster thereby simplifies central government
and ignores how local forces used it. These dia-
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lectical relations are, however, central to other
work on the water politics of the western U.S. For
example, Pisani draws attention to the diversity
of water laws in the West throughout the second
half of the nineteenth and well into the twentieth
century. The significance of this diversity lies not
in some antiquarian objection to generalization,
but, rather, in the continuing  extent of  local
autonomy in the face of widespread fears of mo-
nopoly  and  federal interference with property
rights. Under these conditions, local control was
preferred by many. Pisani concludes that:
At the state level, the diversity of western water laws
was potent evidence of the power of localism. In
fact, virtually all water law reforms were undertaken
not in the name of rationality and bureaucratic
order, but rather, because one group of water users
sought dominance over another, or one community,
region, or state sought to gain a competitive advan-
tage over another (1992:335).
In trying to referee local conflicts, central govern-
ment was drawn into and became a resource in
those struggles.  At least in the case  of water
policy, it did not roll over locality and variety in
the name of instrumental reason or bureaucratic
fiat.
Walton goes even further in raising problems
for Worster’s treatment of resistance. In a study
of water use in Owens Valley, he notes how
central government involvement in the conflict
between locals and the city of Los Angeles legiti-
mized resistance even as it asserted interference.
In constructing a justice argument around re-
source use, the government deployed essentially
contestable terms, circulating a rhetoric of inter-
vention that could be appropriated as a rhetoric
of  resistance. Thus, Theodore  Roosevelt pro-
moted the “progressive” state by promising to use
state power to drive the development of moral
capitalism. As such, the water needs of the urban
center of Los Angeles took priority in strictly
utilitarian terms, but the Owens Valley citizens
presented themselves as pioneers of moral capi-
talism in exactly these terms. They presented
small-town society and agricultural smallholders
as the very backbone of the moral economy. In
ensuring obedience and coping with opposition,
the state both enlarged its competence and arro-
gated to itself more responsibilities. These re-
sponsibilities, however, subsequently became
resources with which the locality fought both
incorporation and exploitation. In the 1970s, this
expansion of state activity took the form of wel-
farism, and again it could be used either to insist
on the rights of the conurbation of Los Angeles
or to assert the contrary claims of the people of
Owens Valley, this time in the language of
environmentalism and the protection of col-
lective natural assets. The legitimacy of central-
government intervention is thus seen to rest on
justice, but then justice must in some measure be
seen to be impartial. As Walton notes, “the state
in modern society is both a relation of domination
and an invitation to protest” (1992:307). That
invitation will be accepted, in part, according to
the strengths of local  traditions of resistance,
traditions that historical work might uncover and
nurture. It is an invitation that Worster’s pessi-
mism leaves untheorized and unrecognized.
Finally, there is something distinctly nostalgic
about Worster’s evocation of an earlier, kindlier,
Arcadian view of nature. As Cronon (1992c)
shows, it replaces the “progress” narratives with
“tragic” ones (see Table 1). These tragic visions
rest upon, as White (1995:178) argues, the “de-
monization of modern machines and the senti-
mentalization of archaic forms of labor allow[ing]
a bifurcation of work into the relatively benign
and even instructive, and the modern and de-
structive.” As White also suggests, this attitude
may be an adequate basis for gardening, but it can
hardly serve to address the sort of work from
which people can make a living. White is surely
right to argue that this leaves the world of modern
work to the propagandists of large corporations,
who are thus able to gather about them the
shabby ecological virtue of “wise use” in a stand
off where too many environmentalists argue for
leisure amenities over any sort of productive
work. The rigid dualism of this environmentalist
perspective, as Cronon (1995b:81) has pointed
out, ultimately leaves us with no place to think
about humans as part of nature: “We thereby
leave ourselves with little hope of discovering
what an ethical, sustainable, honorable human
place in nature might actually look like.” Para-
doxically, this strand  of environmentalism re-
mains  within  the  tragic vision of the frontier
thesis: “The frontier narrative was about settling
a new land; it offered little wisdom about how best
to live once the settling was done and the new
land had become old” (Cronon 1992d:79).
In these ways, we may see  how evaluating
Worster’s historical writings may, in turn, inform
a critique of his values; how the circle between
facts and values may be made virtuous through a
consideration of how values direct inquiry but
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also of how inquiries should revise values. Worster
is quite clear about this aspect of the New West-
ern History: “The history of this region, if it wants
to be vital and listened to, cannot be kept isolated
from public controversy, struggles over power, the
search for moral standards, or the ongoing human
debate over fundamental principles and values”
(1991:23). Worster’s excavation and explication
of those principles have been largely shaped by
the Arcadian view of nature that he set out in his
earliest work, but it would be unfair to give the
impression that he only pays attention to social
justice insofar as it is implicated in imperial atti-
tudes towards nature. In a recent essay, Worster
has contrasted Native American and European
settlers’ views of property rights. He argues that
the American government violated the agree-
ments they made with the Lakotas when they
took their land. There are thus legitimate grounds
for the Lakotas’ claim on the use of the Black
Hills. This claim need not rely upon religious
attitudes to nature or upon historical precedence
in occupying land. More simply, “[a] deeply felt
wound that has festered for a hundred years might
be healed and we could get on with the task of
living with one another in mutual respect”
(1992d:153). It is to such normative issues of
fairness, redress, and social justice that I now
turn.
Justice and the Middle Ground
Richard White has been concerned mainly
with the history of Native American peoples and
with the transformation of their ecologies under
the impress of the frontier process. Like Worster,
White echoes Horkheimer and Adorno (1979) in
noting how the control of nature by some people
may be the vehicle for the social control of other
people. The monopolization of environmental
resources by the new European settlers prevented
the reproduction of the Native American way of
life, leaving the aboriginal people, in economic
terms, a dependent people. But White speaks
from a more nuanced ecological and political
position than has characterized some of the criti-
cisms of industrial society that have animated
Worster’s work. Commenting on a paper by Wor-
ster (1990a), White (1990a) drew attention to
some of the problems with Worster’s ecological
critique of capitalism and, in particular, to the
difficulty of treating ecological climax as a stable
measure against which the destruction wrought
by human action might be measured. White has
noted that historians have shown how extensive
human modifications of the natural world have
been over a very long period of time and have
made “questions of climax and succession seem
abstractions with few equivalents in the actual
landscape” (1992a:xvii). He has also argued that
just as environmental “causality” is complicated,
so must be the “moral emphasis” of the historian
(1990a:1114). (Cronon has remarked that
“White’s favorite . . . way of describing the past is
to say that it is ‘complex’ ” [1992a:xv]). The de-
velopment of White’s work shows an increasing
unease with some forms of ecological foundation-
alism and a growing recognition that the “[i]ssues
of language, of discourse, of texts, and of creation
of the subject that so occupy postmodernist schol-
arship are quite serious ones” (1992a:xvii).
White’s work, however, also rests on a belief that
“[t]here was, and remains, a tangible physical
world that sometimes affirmed but often mocked
the representations designed to constrain it. For
all the power of the postmodernist critique, it
neglects this physical, tangible world, a world of
substantial bodies, and trivializes our experience
in it” (1992b:874). As a result of both of these
views, White urges historians to explore the “in-
terplay of ideational and material elements”
(1990a:1116) in the replication and change of
regional assemblages of people, animals, and
plants. This interaction between culture and en-
vironment is a central theme of his work:
Nature is at once a physical setting where living
beings exist in complex  relationships with each
other, and a human invention. Humans create a
shifting set of cultural concepts about the physical
world and identify these concepts as nature. When
they act, humans do so on the basis of these cultural
formulations, but their actions rebound on an actual
physical world. Recreating these cultural formula-
tions for any given period is the problem (1985:306).
It might seem that this leaves little room in his-
torical writing for explicitly normative concerns,
and in rejecting reductionist accounts of the role
of culture in environmental change, White un-
derlines the problems this poses for the moral
stance of writers such as Worster: “Historians
would still lack  the overarching standards  by
which we should judge change, but it is a pipe
dream that we shall find such standards in either
nature or history” (1990a:1116). Nevertheless,
value judgments remain intrinsic to the histories
White writes, and their negotiation is of special
interest given his recognition of the force of both
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the antifoundational critique of ecology and the
postmodernist critique of meaning.
White accepts the moral intentions of the en-
vironmentalist critique of modern American so-
ciety, although he is unwilling to cast the attack
in terms of a fall from pristine, natural grace. His
argument appears to be that Euro-American at-
titudes to nature are so reckless of the demands
of variety, sustainability, and security that acting
upon them surely courts danger. More important,
the Euro-American transformation of North
American land has had tragic consequences for
Native Americans that, alongside questions relat-
ing to nature, are pressing issues of social justice.
Justice is the key term in understanding White’s
work.9 Operationalized in various ways, it con-
nects both a moral critique of the consequences
of the transformation of nature and modern
political imperatives of redress owing to Native
Americans to an empirical account of the cultural
context of environmental change. Justice is to be
found neither in nature nor in history, rather, it is
something that we bring to our evaluation of the
actions of human beings both in the past and the
present.
Much as Worster has done, White understands
the hubris of Euro-American attitudes toward
nature. These  attitudes  entail dividing nature
into those species that are useful to Euro-
Americans and those that are not. Species, then,
are of no intrinsic value. In his study of Island
County, Washington, White notes that: “Ameri-
cans reduced the complex view of the Indians to
a few simple categories. The new farmers saw
most native plants as simply ‘weeds’ or ‘brush.’
Land that grew these plants was, in the words of
the census, ‘unimproved’ ” (1980:41). This treat-
ment of nature as resources and, given the nature
of the economy, as commodities, directed the
American gaze over the land. It embodied clear
political choices in favor of certain uses (and
users) of the land over others. For example, when,
in exploring the American West in the late nine-
teenth century, Clarence King “chose to use the
United States Geological Survey primarily to sur-
vey mineral deposits (rather than dam sites and
water sources for irrigation), he chose to empha-
size resources whose ultimate development would
benefit mining corporations and not western
farmers” (1991b:135). Similarly, in viewing their
domesticated animals as “sentient tools”
(1994a:238), Euro-Americans defined by default
those other animals not subject to their will as
useless enemies, creating a “biological monarchy
where humans reigned, where uselessness among
lesser living things was a crime punishable by
death, and where enterprise was the reigning
virtue” (p.257). Being ruled by enterprise entailed
the production of a narrow range of species and
crops, the latter of which were selected based on
market prices rather than on immediate subsis-
tence needs (1980:61–62).
As Cronon has argued, property relations
partly connote ecological relations (1983:72).
The creation of Euro-American titles to land
largely mirrors the more general story of capital-
ism’s primitive accumulation. White concurs
with this assessment, noting that: “Americans
believed  that how they distributed  the public
domain determined the kind of society they were
creating” (1991b:140). Land  allocation was a
contested act of remaking society after an agrar-
ian ideal. Yet that ideal took many forms, from
large ranches to small farms and from petty com-
modity production to wage and slave labor. With-
out regard for aridity or for the competing
demands of grazing, logging, and mining, north-
ern Republicans tried to allocate land in the West
to homesteads of the size that had proved accept-
able in the humid East. The demand for these
homestead plots was limited by the failure of
many small farms in the West. Yet loggers, ranch-
ers, and miners continued to move onto public
lands. The forms of access this latter set of users
were eventually recognized as having still left the
federal government with large property holdings
in the West, in stark contrast to its much smaller
holdings in the East. The survival of this public
domain in the West owed much to the conflict
between different varieties of the agrarian ideal,
and to ecological realities such as the unsustain-
ability of certain land uses given the physical
conditions prevailing in parts of the West.
White traces the dominant role played by the
federal government in directing economic devel-
opment in the West to the retention of a large
public-lands domain. This, in turn, was partly
sustained by what many have seen as a fundamen-
tally new attitude toward nature among early
twentieth-century Americans: conservation. But
here, White sees less discontinuity, linking con-
servation to an embedded instrumentalism char-
acterizing American attitudes toward nature
more generally. For him, conservation is simply a
newly profitable use of nature as urban leisure
ground:
The attempt to preserve these tokens of the natural
world does not seem the outgrowth of any significant
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new attitude toward nature. The same basic stand-
ard, economic value, still governed the attempts at
preservation. Remnants of the older natural systems
have attained greater value as they grew more scarce
and as urban dwellers gained the time and the means
to enjoy them (1980:158).
White thus appears to endorse John Muir’s criti-
cisms of the utilitarian notion of monumentalism
that motivated the preservation of certain natural
landscape features in the U.S. He remarks that
Muir “wanted nature protected so that humans
might momentarily escape their human condition
by mystical communion with forces greater than
themselves” (1991b:411). As part of the conser-
vation ethic, women and children were encour-
aged to appreciate nature as a repository in which
“cute animals”  were saved. Yellowstone Park,
“[a]lthough presented as a salvaged remnant of
aboriginal America, . . . by the late twentieth
century came more to resemble a petting zoo with
a highway running through it” (1994a:272). For
men, on the other hand:
Sportsmen, as distinct from hunters, began  to
argue that a particular kind of virtue—hardiness,
bravery, self-reliance—impossible to cultivate in
an urban, industrial environment, was the true
product of the hunt . . . By the early twentieth
century, they had clearly won their battle to pro-
tect game populations. By dying so that American
males could maintain  their  virility  and  virtue,
game animals achieved a symbolic utility and
protected status (p.270).
The reference to Muir suggests some grounds
for the implicit critique, but let us consider an-
other line of criticism developed in these studies.
In particular, White wants to draw attention to
the survival of plant and animal species attendant
with the Euro-American attitude to nature. Some
consequences are unintended, many are indirect,
and all are complicated. He believes that Ameri-
can  society has  not  developed  or empowered
institutions that could monitor and control them:
“Historically, the farmer, the lumberman, and the
fisherman have proved more adept at refining
technologies and increasing the scope and rate of
environmental change than the larger society has
been in gauging the consequences of the tech-
nologies and in creating institutional means to
control them” (1980:159). In the absence of in-
stitutional checks, ecological crisis has proven a
stern teacher. Euro-Americans have had to “put
their ideological formulations of nature at risk in
the physical world” (1992b:889).
In this view, Americans have paradoxically
learned about nature from their failure to domi-
nate it, whereas it is out of their subjugation of
the Native Americans that their historical un-
learning has sprung. At first, Native Americans
and Euro-Americans “regarded each other as
alien, as other, as virtually nonhuman” (White
1991a:ix). Although this view of the native peo-
ples remained  current  back  in Europe, immi-
grants and aboriginal peoples soon met on more
equal terms in North America and forged a “com-
mon, mutually comprehensible world” (White
1991a:ix). Later, after breaking the autonomy of
Native American peoples, Euro-Americans no
longer feared nor felt any need to reach accom-
modation with them, and could then recreate
“the Indians as alien, as exotic, as other” (p. x).
At this stage:
The fact that Indians actually starved because colo-
nizers had come, that they died in such prodigious
numbers from disease in part because colonizers had
wrecked their subsistence systems, and that these
subsistence systems themselves were inextricably
intertwined with the political, social, and cultural
relations colonizers set out to undermine subverted
the more beneficent rationale that colonialism
brought a better life to all. Colonialists, therefore,
tended to prefer imaginary pasts and more benign
presents (White 1983:315).
In this imaginary past, Native Americans had
not substantially changed the natural world:
“[s]ince humans had not shaped the West into a
landscape familiar to expectations conditioned by
western Europe and eastern North America, they
concluded that humans had not shaped the land
at all” (White 1991b:57). The view that Native
Americans merely passed over the land without
leaving any trace has a number of consequences,
one of which White mentions in his conversation
with Cronon:
Actually this idea demeans Indians. It makes them
seem simply like an animal species, and thus de-
prives them of culture. It also demeans the environ-
ment by so simplifying it that all changes come to
seem negative—as if somehow the ideal is never to
have  been here  at  all. It’s  a crude view of the
environment, and it’s a crude view of Indians
(Cronon and White 1986:20).
Faced with such unjust characterizations of
Indians, the first task of the historian is to restore
the dignity of historicity and culture to the Native
Americans. E. P. Thompson made this point most
eloquently when he spoke of “seeking to rescue”
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the  artisans whose trades had been abolished
during the industrial revolution, from “the enor-
mous condescension of posterity” (1968:13). The
hopes and aspirations of these people were mean-
ingful in terms of their own experience and it is
an abuse of hindsight to represent them as little
more than doomed bystanders at the history of
their own period. The right to a just hearing in
historical writing is even more important in the
case of Native Americans because, of course, they
still live in America. Their survival and even, over
the last century, their renewed increase in num-
bers, present a particular challenge to histories
premised upon assumptions of white racial supe-
riority or the inevitable disappearance of native
peoples. As Berkhofer has written, this recogni-
tion changes  the agenda  of Native American
history from a study solely of the relations be-
tween aboriginal peoples and European arrivals
to one that explores cultural resilience on its own
terms (1971). White’s own approach is under-
pinned by just such an appreciation of Native
American culture: “[t]he Bridges, Franks, and
other families of the fishing rights struggles on the
Nisqually and Puyallup rivers of western Wash-
ington first allowed me to realize the quite differ-
ent ways Indian peoples can have of perceiving
and organizing the world, and how tenacious and
creative seemingly powerless people can be in
fighting to maintain a way of life” (1983:xii). So,
beyond the condescension that posterity brings,
there is also a need to consider issues of justice in
the present.
Redress and Fairness
I suggest that empirical questions are involved
in these questions of justice, and that empirical
research provides guidance in resolving matters
of justice. To begin this task, I introduce two
principles from the work of John Rawls: those of
redress and fairness. First, redress:
This is the principle that undeserved inequalities
call for redress; and since inequalities of birth and
natural endowment are undeserved, these inequali-
ties are to be somehow compensated for. Thus the
principle holds that in order to treat all persons
equally, to provide genuine equality of opportunity,
society must give more attention to those with fewer
native assets and to those born into less favorable
social positions (Rawls 1972:100).
Second, fairness:
This principle holds that a person is required to do
[their] part as defined by the rules of an institution
when two conditions are met: first, the institution is
just (or fair), . . . and second, one has voluntarily
accepted the benefits of the arrangement or taken
advantage of the opportunities it offers to further
one’s interests (Rawls 1972:111–12).
White’s work shows, first, that the unfavorable
social positions occupied by Native Americans
are undeserved, intentional consequences of
Euro-American aggression and, second, that in
no sense can Native Americans be said to have
voluntarily accepted the arrangements under
which they find themselves placed. The history of
native peoples since  the arrival  of  Europeans
sustains claims on their behalf to a more generous
settlement from Euro-Americans on the grounds
both of fairness and redress. That realization,
rather than being a concession to a more nuanced
historical understanding, has actually come from
the continued vitality and demands of the First
Nations themselves. Just as the agenda of social
history more generally has been shaped by the
demands of the new social movements, so writing
about Native Americans has been shaped by their
demands. A book such as David Wishart’s An
Unspeakable Sadness is decisively framed by the
cases put by native peoples to the Indian Claims
Commission after 1946. The claims process,
which invited final settlement  of  outstanding
grievances through providing compensation for
earlier forced, illegal, or unfair land sales, assisted
in the reassertion of native rights and identities
that has forced itself upon the attention of histo-
rians and historical geographers. Instead of the
final settlement resulting in the complete ab-
sorption of native peoples into the federal pol-
ity, it has in fact produced a deeper pluralism
and separatism.
Writing of the Indians of Island County, Wash-
ington, White notes that: “[t]hrough observation
and tradition, Indians altered natural communi-
ties to fit their needs without, in the process,
destroying the ability of those communities to
sustain the cultures that had created them”
(1980:25). At several points, he comments on the
way some groups of native peoples used different
resources, often in different places and at differ-
ent seasons, to secure a living from the land. In
some cases, they farmed part of the year and
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hunted the rest. In many cases, they had both a
primary and a secondary food cycle so that if one
set of food sources failed them, they could get by
with others. Seeking food security rather than
maximizing production, Native Americans had a
number of ways of ensuring sustainability. They
regulated the exhaustion of the land by moving
their fields after a period. They controlled fertility
through hunger and, in some cases, infanticide.
The game they hunted thrived in the contested
borderlands between Indian tribal groups or vil-
lages. In killing game, they took what they needed
for survival. This was all very different from the
attitudes of  Euro-Americans. For  example,  in
contrast to the Euro-Americans’  instrumental
view of animals:
Indian religions made hunting holy and gave
human-animal relations a depth and complexity
largely lacking among Europeans. In hunting, some
persons died so that others might live. Ceremonies
preceded the kill. Animals consented to die; they,
or more powerful beings—holy people, keepers of
the game, or other supernaturals—pitied the hunter
and instructed him in the rules and rituals necessary
to kill them. Indians killed game as much by prayer,
pleading, and reverence as by the arrow or spear.
They recognized the obvious wariness of game and
the reluctance of animals to die, but they explained
it in terms of previous ritual abuse by humans or even
supernaturals. The difficulty of obtaining the con-
sent of animals only made strict observance of hunt-
ing rituals all the more necessary (White
1994a:237–38).
European colonization made it impossible for
Native Americans to continue with this way of
life. Euro-Americans granted themselves exclu-
sive title to parts of the natural world that were
crucial to the spatially dispersed, complementary
food cycles of the Indians: “[i]n a society in which
law, rather than tradition or religion, increasingly
defined man’s relationship with the land and sea,
the Salish became a people literally without
rights. They were cut off by law from centuries-
old fishing grounds, and the state allocated their
catch to white commercial fishermen” (White
1980:72). Settlers’ farms hemmed in Native
American periodic and dispersed land clearances,
leaving them nowhere to move when the soil
neared exhaustion. Ultimately, attacks on the
religions of native peoples made their regulation
of population numbers impossible. A conscious
policy of creating dependence among the Native
Americans through debt and alcohol allowed
Euro-Americans to secure ever more furs from
some groups of native peoples, enhancing the
importance of warriors over peacekeepers and
further compromising subsistence activities. This
deepening involvement with the fur trade in the
Great Lakes region “gradually created new mean-
ings and altered the meanings of old objects” so
that, for example, while anyone could move into
tribal territories and kill game if they were hungry,
only people with local rights were permitted to
take away  the  furs,  which could  then  be  ex-
changed for European goods (White
1991a:103–04). The stabilizing institutions of In-
dian society that ensured ecological sustainability
were undermined, and “[a]lthough they had once
been able to feed, clothe, and house themselves
with security and comfort, Indians gradually re-
sorted to whites for clothing and food,” until “[i]n
the end, whites specified what was to be ex-
changed, how it was to be exchanged, what the
Indians were to receive, and how they were to use
it” (White 1983:xix). To reach this point, the
settlers had waged explicit war upon Native
American subsistence systems. Preventing Na-
tive Americans from gathering food, for example,
was often a bitterly effective tactic against such
militarily powerful, recalcitrant tribes as the Lak-
ota (White 1991b:104). Peoples such as the Sal-
ish were gradually forced out of the wider
American society and consigned to the refuge of
small, dedicated reservations (White 1980:73).
Before this point was reached, native peoples
had made many creative attempts to adjust to
Euro-American demands for resources and to
military and biological threats. Their sustainable
agricultural systems did not collapse from within
in some Malthusian fashion (White 1983:316).
Rather than passive impediments to European
expansion, Native Americans sought many and
varied forms of accommodation with the imperi-
alists. Historians do them an injustice when they
fail to recognize this, treating Native Americans
as an ahistorical entity mired in traditional, inter-
necine strife (White 1978:343). Political forms
such as villages, tribes, nations, republics, and
ultimately  ethnicities were  institutions shaped
and reshaped out of this creative adaptation. To
restore this complexity to the historical picture is
not only to do the Indians descriptive justice, it is
also to document the explicit aggression by which
Native Americans were forced off the middle
ground of compromise and coexistence and mar-
ginalized as part of a social contract they can
hardly be said to have chosen. The story of how
Native American society was underdeveloped,
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then, serves as an explicit rebuke to the supposed
equality of all before the law. Nevertheless,
White’s studies also provide empirical grounds for
maintaining that alternative arrangements are
imaginable in the present. This is true both of the
importance of Native American theories of na-
ture  and of the tenuous achievements  of the
middle ground. I now turn to these two lessons of
history.
Two History Lessons
For White, the contrast between Native and
Euro-American ways of relating to natural re-
sources is an instructive one: “[w]e can’t copy
Indian ways of understanding nature, we’re too
different. But studying them throws our own as-
sumptions into starker relief and suggests short-
comings in our relationships with nature that
could cost us dearly in the long run” (Cronon and
White 1986:25). Clearly, these lessons include
the importance of sustainability, but White is also
anxious to contrast the views of native peoples
with those of romantic conservationists: “One
thing that has impressed me about Indians I’ve
known is their realization that this is a harsh
planet, that they survive by the deaths of other
creatures. There’s no attempt to gloss over that
or romanticize it” (p. 20). The second historical
lesson drawn by White concerns what he terms
the middle ground. On this middle ground, until
the autonomy of Indians had been broken, whites
and Indians found ways to share notions of jus-
tice, price and fair play despite the very different
repertoire of cultural resources they brought to
the exchange, a tribute to the ability of people to
empathize with each other’s frames of reference
sufficiently to make themselves comprehensible
in terms of each other’s presuppositions. This
rapprochement undermines the pessimism im-
plicit in radical cultural relativism. It provides
grounds for both a recognition and a suspension
of difference that allows us to respect and grant
rights to the “other.” Culture shapes our treat-
ment of other people, as well as our treatment of
the environment, but this is not a view of culture
as incommensurability: we can find ways to ac-
cept alterity and still reach a mutually compre-
hensible and acceptable accommodation with the
“other.” In a recent paper, White has documented
how General Custer and  Sitting Bull became
central elements in the respective mythologies of
Euro- and Native Americans, while also showing
how the mythologized Custer and Sitting Bull
migrated across this divide and became reworked
elements in the stories of both cultures. Invoking
a sense of history as storytelling, White suggests
that “[t]hese stories we tell about the West matter.
They not only reveal how we think about our-
selves, they help determine how we choose to act
towards each other” (1994b:55). The meander-
ing of stories between cultures suggests that while
myths and legends “told about the frontier and
the West have certainly not always been told with
democratic intent . . . they have had democratic
consequences. Attempts  to close them off, to
confine their possession to certain groups, have
failed. They have become democratic stories in-
habited by diverse Americans and open to multi-
ple retellings . . .” (p. 55). This “imaginative
coherence” speaks to the possibility of a tolerant
pluralism. In this sense, by telling the story of
Native American peoples in terms of their own
understanding of social and environmental
change, White is providing the empirical basis for
justice claims of fairness and redress. He is pro-
viding a just description, restoring agency and
dignity to the native peoples about whom he
writes. He is providing the prescriptive basis for
justice claims of redress. Native Americans con-
tinue to be without full equality of opportunity in
the U.S. due to the imposition by force of a social
contract to which they did not assent. White is,
finally, helping establish the bonds of common
humanity  (empathy) and plurality (solidarity)
which enable those justice claims to be heard.
This is a subtle interweaving of empirical and
normative concerns, but I believe it offers more
than a naive ecological foundationalism or a post-
modern cultural relativism.
Citizenship and Regionalism
Patricia Limerick has been a staunch critic of
the legacy of Turner for its ethnocentrism, its
narrow view of the economy, its  omission  of
women, its cavalier disregard of environmental
degradation, its severance of nineteenth-century
history from twentieth-century politics, and, fi-
nally, because it “blurs the fact of conquest and
throws a veil over the similarities between the
story of American westward expansion and the
planetary story of the expansion of American
empires” (1994a:75). She has contended that all
attempts to rescue the Turnerian emphasis on the
American West as a process, such as those of
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Aron (1994) and Cronon et al. (1992), inevitably
privilege the Anglo-American movement from
East to West over all other population movements
and ethnic identities, including not simply Native
Americans, but also Latinos, Asian-Americans,
and African-Americans. Yet, in a recent paper,
she offers a definitional truce on the grounds that
a survey of the uses made of the term “frontier”
in some four thousand newspaper headlines has
convinced her that the American public cares
little for these academic squabbles and continues
to use the term “frontier” in an overwhelmingly
positive manner. The “frontier” has become “a
kind of multicultural common property”  that
“works as a cultural glue—a mental and emo-
tional fastener that, in some very curious and
unexpected ways, works to hold  us together”
(Limerick 1994a:94). This is somewhat similar to
White’s emphasis on the imaginative coherence
offered by common stories, but Limerick is more
explicitly concerned than White with the links
between this public consumption of history and
the public role of the historian. I argue that the
central normative concern of Limerick’s work is
with citizenship, and that she seeks to ground the
claims of citizenship in an avowedly regional po-
litical community.
The Public Intellectual
Limerick is anxious to engage in a debate on
the nature of western history beyond the acad-
emy, and is delighted to find that increasingly
possible: “[a]ll around the West, the public is
eager to join in this discussion, giving western
historians in the late twentieth century the finest
opportunity imaginable to revive the role of the
western public intellectual” (1991a:77). This will
only occur, however, if historians face some pain-
ful realities and become more self-consciously
engaged, and this will involve a transformation of
history itself: “The transition from a historical
profession intoxicated with the dream of objec-
tive, neutral, value-free inquiry to a historical
profession aware of, and honest about, the un-
avoidable reality of subjectivity, is, under-
standably, an awkward and uncomfortable one”
(1992a:135). Indeed, Limerick notes that those
who have wished to restore the Old Western
History  have done so largely in the  name of
historical objectivity, yet: “[a]lthough they
thought of themselves as rigorously neutral, with-
out ideology or bias, they had in fact placed their
sympathies with English-speaking male pioneers
and then called that point of view objectivity”
(1991a:67). For example, in a paper on the work
of Ray Allen Billington, Limerick documented
the way his historical studies treated all ethnici-
ties other than Anglo-American as barriers to
American progress, giving minorities little atten-
tion in their own right. She recognizes Billington’s
personal “rejection of bigotry,” but she notes that
this led him to avoid recognizing adequately the
importance of racial difference in historical inter-
pretation: “[e]ven if we should prove able to write
of our future without reference to racial differ-
ences, we will never  gain that license  in the
writing of the actual, not the imagined, past”
(1991b:306). On the other hand, she has nothing
but praise for Wallace Stegner, whose wartime
propaganda book, One Nation (1945), looked
without blinking at the racism of contemporary
society and warned Americans of its insidious
effects: “we are much in his debt because he said
these things so clearly and so forcefully, before
many others were saying them, or even thinking
them” (1993b:65). Public intellectuals, then,
must recognize and articulate their personal sub-
jectivity in the context of a wider field of subjec-
tivities and experiences.
In Limerick’s case, an individual voice is
grounded in her upbringing in Banning, Califor-
nia. At several points, she insists that the roman-
tic myths of the Turnerian frontier find no
purchase in Banning: “[t]ailored to fit Portage,
Wisconsin, Turner’s frontier theory simply won’t
fit Banning, regardless of how you trim and stitch,
tighten and loosen” (1991c:82). Her childhood
bore testimony to a different story:
I grew up in Banning, California, where one town
patriarch made much of his money providing the
prostitutes for the workers building the aqueduct
taking Colorado River water to Los Angeles. Out-
side Banning was the Morongo Indian Reservation,
and kids from the reservation were with us in school
until about the eighth grade, and then, when we
graduated from high school, most of the Indian kids
had dropped out. How, in other words, could I have
acquired illusions about western history? Illusions?
In Banning? (Worster et al. 1989:321–22).
It is clear, however, that this is the product of
retrospective reflection, for elsewhere she says of
her childhood that: “I took the landscape for
granted, and I had no uncertainties about water,
even if I also had no idea where it came from”
(Limerick 1985:13). This retrospective reflection
is through the lens of her subsequent political
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education. To a large extent, the values that inform
Limerick’s history come from an acceptance of
the liberal agenda of the 1960s. She refers to
herself as a “palaeo-liberal” (Worster et al.
1989:321), remarking of the New Western His-
tory: “The influence of perspectives originating in
the 1960s is unmistakable” (Limerick et al.
1991:x). The New Western History registers the
effect of the new social movements on the agenda
of social history: “In the broadest sense, the ‘New
Western History,’ is simply the aggregation of
studies of race, gender, class, community, eco-
nomic dependency, and the environment in the
West conducted over the last twenty-five years”
(White 1992c:10).
Yet feminism, multiculturalism, and environ-
mentalism make legitimate claims upon the his-
torian’s attention, claims that go beyond both the
band-aid of a parenthetical “political correctness”
and the “conjunction school of historical revi-
sion” (Limerick 1991a:64), which simply adds
new sections to old textbooks.10 The exclusions
and elisions in the Old Western History result in
explanations of the past that are inadequate even
on their own terms, and which fail to confront the
historical construction of political identities in
the present. What I have described as the virtu-
ous circularity of facts and values, Limerick refers
to as a spiral. Writing of the work of the landscape
photographer, Mark Klett, she remarks that
“[t]hrough his experience in the Rephotographic
Survey Project, Klett came to know, first-hand,
that we live in a relativistic universe, where an
individual photographer can, by the choice of his
vantage point, change what we think of as real-
ity”; but by looking again, longer and harder:
“[t]he path of perception of the American West
thus traces a spiral, as Euro-Americans have, over
time, gotten ‘warmer,’ closer to the center, but by
no means all the way there” (1992b:108–09).
Elsewhere, and more ingeniously, Limerick uses
the metaphor of conversation for this relationship
between perspective and scholarship.
Conversations on the “New”
Despite her despair about the influence that
academic debates over the meaning of the “fron-
tier” are having on the uses of the term in public
discourse, Limerick is anything but pessimistic
about the potential importance of clear historical
writing for the contemporary construction of po-
litical identities. Limerick coined the phrase
“New Western History” for a symposium held to
launch a touring exhibition about the history of
the West. The phrase, and the brief explanation
she offered about the movement, were taken up
in a variety of news media including the Washing-
ton Post, the New York Times, and National Public
Radio (Limerick 1991a:61).
Even more dramatically, the revisionism of the
New Western History was on display at the Smith-
sonian Institution National Museum of Ameri-
can Art in Washington, in an exhibit entitled
“The West as America: Reinterpreting Images of
the Frontier, 1820–1920,” where it offended the
patriotism of some Americans still basking in the
aftermath of the Gulf War. The labels in the
exhibit “redefined many western artists as apolo-
gists for Manifest Destiny who ignored or were
culturally blind to the displacement of indigenous
people and  to the environmental degradation
that accompanied the settling of the West” (Gul-
liford 1992:200). The media uproar was exten-
sive. More than seven hundred people entered
their reactions in the comment books, the major-
ity being positive (Truettner and Nemerov
1992:70). Yet critics were bothered by the sugges-
tion that great art was anything but objective
reporting and America’s frontier not the leading
edge of world civilization. Daniel Boorstin char-
acterized the exhibition as “perverse, historically
inaccurate, destructive”  (Gulliford 1992:201).
On the five-hundredth anniversary of Columbus,
the American public objected so strongly to a
section on “Inventing the Indian” that the text
on the labels was toned down. This public interest
suggests at least the possibility of a conversation.
Conversation is important to Limerick. She
celebrates dialogue: “Each incident . . . in which
Westerners of these various backgrounds and
convictions defy the odds and choose not  to
attack each other, nor to evade each other, but to
converse—each of these incidents seems to me
powerfully freighted with hope” (Limerick
1991d:45). The development of a responsible and
democratic politics in the West depends upon
such a dialogue: “The human diversity of the
West remains . . . a conversation waiting to hap-
pen” (Holthaus et al. 1991:9). This is where she
places her hope: “Although there is no reason to
argue that residents of the West now live with an
enlightened regional self-consciousness based on
. . . elements of commonality, there is also no
reason to argue that they could not or should not”
(Limerick 1991a:71). A more adequate under-
standing will require a true appreciation of the dis-
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tinctiveness of the West as well as an appreciation
of the experiences and expectations of the diverse
human groups sharing the land. In a sense, Lim-
erick wants regional identity to suspend ethnic
difference. The West should thereby define an
imagined community to which all could belong.
In this view, Stegner is a sympathetic figure not
only because he urged the cause of antiracism
against the danger of the U.S. “balkanizing,” but
also because he longed, in his own words, for “a
past to which [he] could be tribally and emotion-
ally committed” (quoted in Limerick 1993b:66).
Here, the legacy of Turner seems particularly
pernicious. In treating the West as a process of
frontiering ending in 1890, Turner not only cut
the modern West off from its past but also made
it the temporary adjunct of a story of national
history which returned to the East and, especially,
to the Midwest. Limerick  complains that too
many modern history textbooks do much the
same as Turner in this regard: “[r]egardless of the
politics, the methods, or the ages of the textbook’s
authors, the West registers as a transitory phase
of national history and not as a permanent place”
(1992c:1383). The marginal place given to the
West in national history offends  her regional
pride. Limerick believes, further, that it is only
upon a version of regional pride that an enlight-
ened tribalism might be founded. She finds this
resurgent self-confidence in environmental sci-
ence, literature, painting, and photography;
hence her enthusiasm for the work of Mark Klett:
“[i]ntentionally or not, the Rephotographic Sur-
vey Project rejected the abstract, shifty definition
of the West as a frontier, and saw the West as a set
of solid and continuous places. The project by its
very nature assumed a connection between the
western present and the western past”
(1992b:13). For Limerick, this is the cultivation
of “hindsight without smugness” and is “the use
of the mind that western historians, as well as
westerners in general, most need to develop” (p.
13). The West was and continues to be important,
at least in part, because its past and present teach
the fundamentally multicultural  and environ-
mentally grounded character of American soci-
ety: “With our variety of ethnic backgrounds,
occupations, lengths of residence, passions, con-
victions, ambitions, expectations, and regrets, we
are in this land, and in it together” (1992b:110).
For Limerick, the task of the historian is to pro-
mote that sharing of experience. Referring to the
West as a Babel of different languages, she writes
of the “spirited intellectual effort of communica-
tion” (1992d:176).
Yet dialogue has all too often been wrecked
upon the shoals of Western experience: “First,
Americans came West with high hopes for im-
proved personal fortune, hopes that carried both
the seeds of disappointment and frustration and,
not far beyond, the need for someone to blame.
Second, scapegoats were everywhere at this cross-
roads of the planet, the meeting ground of
Europe, Asia and Latin America” (Limerick
1987:269). The historian can at least restore to
all groups an acknowledgment of their joint work
in shaping the region. By emphasizing the idea of
the West as a meeting ground, she suggests, “we
would have an equitable and accurate way of
giving all the participants their due” (Worster et
al. 1989:317). Turner’s story left one group in the
field as conscious actors and the rest as mere
friction to the progress of civilization. On the
other hand, “The complete story of the invest-
ment of human consciousness in the American
landscape requires attention to the whole set of
participants—indigenous people as well as invad-
ers, eastward-moving Asian-American people as
well as westward-moving Euro-American people.
With anything less, the meaning of the landscape
is fragmented and truncated” (Limerick
1992e:1026).
Using the Western Landscape
Worster raises an important question when he
asks whether Limerick’s Legacy of Conquest pre-
sents the West as primarily a failure of democracy
or of ecological sustainability (Worster  et al.
1989:306). The environment is certainly a cen-
tral concern of Limerick’s work, but the tragedy
of environmental destruction is not the leitmotif
of her work as it is of Worster’s. In Desert Passages
(1985), Limerick looks at writings about the de-
serts of the Southwest U.S. and documents the
various ways the desert has been presented as
obdurate and initially uncooperative nature. In
thinking about the effect of aridity on attitudes to
nature, for example, Limerick offers the desert as
an occasion to think about limits. It is not aridity,
as such, but reflections upon natural limits to
which it has given rise that interest her, and which
give her hope that people in the region might
learn and impart lessons about the dangers of
imperial attitudes toward nature. This recogni-
tion of limits is now available to the nascent
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regional self-consciousness to which she wants to
contribute. Thus, while recognizing that it does
not cover all of the region, she insists on aridity
as a defining characteristic of the West
(1987:135). Aridity has been important at vari-
ous points in defining the historical trajectory of
large parts of the West; it has been one of an
important set of contingent differences marking
the West from the rest of the country (see also
White 1991c:38–39). There is something to be
learned from the legacy of aridity, just as there
is something to be learned from the legacy of
ethnic diversity, and Limerick’s western self-
consciousness needs to be fueled by both.
Her concern to use the landscapes of the West as
a corrective to smug histories of Anglo-American
success informs another collaboration with Mark
Klett on the mining “ghost town” of Rhyolite.
Noting that C. Vann Woodward had declared
that, in its confrontation with failure, the history
of the South taught distinctive and serious lessons
to all Americans, she offers the West as a land-
scape teaching related lessons in failure:
Although the two kinds of regional failure are very
different, ghost towns give the West its most visible
credentials in failure. The impermanence of many
western enterprises confronted many people with
the frustration of failed expectations and ambitions.
Add the fact that the gain of any individual or group
in the West often rested on a corresponding loss for
another individual or group, and the West, as well
as the South, can act as a corrective to the idea that
U.S. history is a “very monotonous repetition of
successes.” The West becomes, thereby, what the
South has long been—a region to take seriously
(Limerick 1994b:43).
The town of Rhyolite, then, rested upon “the
narrow and precarious foundation of extractive
industry and unrestrained economic ambition”
and its failure stands as testimony against both in
this manner: “Haunted by this hard-edged, un-
compromising ghost town, one is encouraged to
consider other, firmer foundations for society”
(Limerick 1994b:46). There is, then, in Limer-
ick’s work, an urgent wish to teach the lessons of
the contradiction between unrestrained eco-
nomic expansion and the limits set by aridity and
finite resources.
These aspects of environmentalism, though
important, are not the dominant themes in her
reflections upon the history of the landscapes of
the Southwest. For that, Limerick turns to land-
scapes as the common ground of ethnic diversity.
She claims that: “[t]he strategy of keeping a focus
on the place and its physical conditions allows an
author to include Indians and Euro-Americans as
people of equal significance and dignity” (Worster
et al. 1989:319). Such common ground becomes
sacred ground: “Where people have labored, suf-
fered, struggled, or even just survived, they have
planted seeds of memory as directly as farmers sow
crops,  and memory has  its roots in the soul”
(Limerick 1992e:1026). The historian needs to
engage with the contestable tangle of memo-
ries—the ghosts of our landscapes—and through
taking up the landscape perspectives of the many
different groups involved in the making of those
landscapes, the historian can advance a conver-
sation about democratic politics. This is a particu-
lar obligation on Euro-American historians, since
they have benefitted from a truncated conversa-
tion that legitimizes their privileges. Indeed, the
Anglo-American obsession with constructing
community out of written law may now provide
resources with which Indian legal activists can
reanimate treaties formerly honored most fre-
quently in the breach, using them to press new
claims (Limerick 1987:331). Landscapes provide
both the common ground of a shared history and
the object of much conflict, plunder, and litiga-
tion. Language, community, and contract; these
define citizenship in the Western Babel. Histori-
ans can join activists in breathing life into scle-
rotic contracts, in translating diverse experiences
into claims on common decency, in lending an
ear and a voice to the subaltern. In this spirit,
Limerick moves between modern  politics and
New Western History, directing both to the di-
lemmas of the structured inequality of Western
multiculturalism.
In summary, Limerick wants to use something
akin to citizenship as a yardstick against which
the multiculturalism of the modern West is meas-
ured and found wanting, and she wants to use the
idea of a common regional history to build bridges
across the ethnic divides. Given her emphasis on
conversation and on landscapes in common, the
major difficulties with her approach to the virtu-
ous circle between facts and values lie in the
extent towhichagenuineregional self-consciousness
can become politically effective and the extent to
which landscape can do service as a metaphor for
actions with commonly shared ends without be-
coming too vague.11 The first stage in her model
of paradigm change in history, which involves
demonstrating that history’s claims to objectivity
are spurious, has largely been achieved. The sec-
ond stage involves changing the public’s view of
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history. Here she can point to the publicity
around the New Western History as evidence that
the argument has leaked out of the ivory tower
and  is now  being engaged with by a broader
public. She might even claim that the book com-
missioned by the Western Governors Associa-
tion, Beyond the Mythic West (1990), suggests that
politics with a capital “P” has been influenced by
these academic debates.
The Virtuous Circle of Facts
and Values
I have argued that Cronon’s work is informed
by the priority that an ethics based on sustainable
development might give to environment in the
description of social and economic development.
I have proposed that Worster’s account of na-
ture’s fall from grace under Euro-American im-
perial ism rests upon a demonization of
technology. I have suggested that White’s con-
cern with justice for Native Americans directs his
attention towards the common ground on which
such claims might be heard. I have described the
way citizenship serves in Limerick’s work as a
yardstick, calling the sins of the past to account
in the claims of the present. I have shown that
these normative frameworks produce narratives
that pose both empirical and ethical challenges.
When Cronon adopts a neoclassical account of
the way nature is embedded in economy, I find
the explanation less satisfying than the attention
given elsewhere in his work to the social context
of resource use. When Worster demonizes tech-
nology, he leaves little scope for recognizing the
forces of resistance on which our hopes for the
future might be based. White’s reticence about
the moral conclusions he draws from his work can
give the impression that empirical complexity is
the inevitable nemesis of social justice. Limerick’s
focus on conversation  prioritizes the develop-
ment of consciousness over an account of the
material changes that the consciousness is at-
tempting to articulate.
In conclusion, I suggest that in the scholarship
of the New Western Historians, we can discern
two moments in the virtuous move from facts to
values. To do so, I draw on Seyia Benhabib’s terms
of norm and utopia (1986; see Table 2). Social
critique based on norms holds society up to its
self-professed principles and measures how far it
falls short, rather like Limerick’s evaluation of
how ethnic diversity is treated today. Beyond
that, we might look to the new values that are not
yet the consensus but that form the basis for new
agendas that go beyond what is already implicitly
conceded in principle even if not in practice. This
norm-based form of critique Benhabib terms im-
manent, for it anticipates little more than the
fulfillment of the currently declared social pro-
ject. In contrast, utopian critique is anticipatory.
It projects a future based on the transfiguration
of the current agenda. Benhabib describes the
nature of immanent critique in Hegel and Marx
where the human subject, which was to be the
bearer of historical change, was an individual who
either thought (Hegel) or worked (Marx). Ben-
habib argues that, in the case of Marx, this work
model of human action privileged humanity as
individual tool user over all other conceptions of
humanity. In particular, she argues that Marx left
undeveloped those parts of his work that dealt
with language as the model of the individual-
in-social relations. Language presupposes a com-
munity of language users. Communication is
inherently participatory and collective. These ar-
eas based on intersubjective interaction suggest
an alternative set of relations beyond the essen-
tially juridical concerns of holding society to its
declared principles. Beyond the world of rights
and entitlements, there is one based on needs and
solidarities that anticipates a future world where
Table 2. Critique, Norm, and Utopia According to Benhabib
Basis of Critique Norm Utopia
Form of critique Immanent Anticipatory
Orientation to current social project Fulfillment Transfiguration
Human activity Work Participation
World of values Rights and entitlements Needs and solidarity
Human subject Collective singularity Participatory pluralism
Conception of the “Other” Generalized Concrete
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plurality is recognized and a communicative eth-
ics has a fuller chance to develop.
This division has obvious implications for the
earlier discussion about the shortcomings of the
emancipatory project implicit in the marxist labor
theory of value, which, in Benhabib’s terms, is
a normative rather than utopian critique of capi-
talist society. Whereas the project of communi-
cative ethics that she takes from the work of
Jürgen Habermas promotes citizenship as partici-
pation in a social conversation, Marx’s labor the-
ory of value treats labor as a universal class that
can act in the name of society as a whole to end
exploitation by recovering alienated labor or capi-
tal for the proletariat. This view, according to
Benhabib, is fundamentally dogmatic. It denies
the plurality of  identities in  society,  many  of
which serve as the basis for experiences of solidar-
ity and respect which equally anticipate utopian
needs going beyond what the currently recog-
nized principles of rights and entitlements would
allow. Instead of the collective singularity of the
proletariat with all the authoritarianism and sub-
jection of means to ends that this entails, Ben-
habib urges attention to the project of
participatory pluralism.
This position finds echoes in the work of
Cronon and Worster, and the emphasis on par-
ticipatory pluralism and society as an ongoing
moral conversation speaks to some of the central
concerns of White and Limerick. Cronon is ex-
plicit about the way  environmentalist history
might “teach us the stories . . . that will help us to
live better, more responsible lives” (1995a:50)
and “keep us morally engaged with the world by
showing us how to care about it and its origins in
ways we had not done before” (1992c:1375). I did
not, however, introduce this brief account of the
work of Benhabib simply to reinforce those nor-
mative orientations nor to reinforce my claims
about the limitations of the Marxist normative
project. Rather, the nature of the moral conver-
sation, according to Benhabib, creates a special
role for the sort of empirical contextualization
that good historical and geographical explanation
provides. Benhabib argues that we have reached
the point in the development of the moral con-
versation where it is possible to recognize that it
entails universal moral respect and egalitarian
reciprocity (1992:30). The moral conversation
will produce ethically correct conclusions if all are
entitled to be heard and if all can raise topics for
consideration. Participation in such a conversa-
tion will deepen people’s sense of civic friendship
and solidarity (p. 11). People will come to take
account of what would be the point of view of the
other participants in the conversation both be-
cause they feel this sense of solidarity and because
they know they need to get the informed consent
of the “other” to any proposals they raise.
Not everyone will be persuaded that a common
moral conversation can indeed build consensus
on substantive ethical and political issues. For
example, Willems-Braun (1997) questions the
likelihood of the suspension of political and eco-
nomic inequalities or the supersession of biased
“common sense” in fora such as environmental
roundtables: “Although these arenas do often
increase possibilities for participation, they do not
by themselves mitigate the relations of power that
are inscribed into public debate through the cate-
gories and identities by which conflicts are organ-
ized and understood” (1997:26–27).  There is
clearly a dangerous essentialism were one to see
the ideal speech situation as uncovering rather
than merely helping constitute an ethical com-
mon ground. Yet,  the antiessentialist position
comes quite close to that sketched out by Ben-
habib when Mouffe follows Rawls in speaking of
overlapping consensus, of “creating a link be-
tween recognized principles and hitherto unfor-
mulated demands” (1993:54)—and even more
strongly when she describes politics as a language
game that is about finding “new usages of the key
terms of a given tradition, and of their use in new
language games that make new forms of life pos-
sible” (p. 17). The major difference comes when
we turn to examine the proposed content of this
overlapping consensus. For Mouffe, it is primarily
procedural. People need to develop a commit-
ment to the fact of political conversation in its
democratic variant. As long as they share the
conversation, they suspend the potential violence
of the differences that brought them onto the
conflictual terrain of politics. Yet, if democratic
subject positions are to be rendered attractive by
showing how they address the needs of the over-
lapping groups of subjugated persons, I see, with
Limerick, no reason why that should not translate
into the perception of overlapping material inter-
ests in fairness and in a more egalitarian economic
order. To some extent, Mouffe acknowledges this
in noting that democracy exists in a field of ten-
sion between equality and liberty. Yet she is very
suspicious of any suggestion that rational debate
might converge on a common conception of what
might  constitute the good life.  Society is too
pluralist for that. Yet, in Benhabib’s defense, it
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might be suggested that the other-regarding di-
mension of civility need not entail loyalty to a
single vision of the good life but might allow
overlapping gestures of egalitarianism which ac-
knowledge certain common claims of the human-
ity we accept as fellow citizens in our polity. Some
of these claims may well be material (to shelter,
to food, to education, to a tolerable standard of
living) but, whatever form they might take, it
seems obvious that they will only develop out of
the common feeling that comes from interaction
and mutual knowledge of the conditions of life
across different sets of identities.
This is very much like White’s discussion of the
middle ground. But the importance of empirical
work takes us further than this. An under-
standing of the “other’s” point of view entails
recognizing both the specific differences that
frame worldviews and the particular context in
which  those framings take  place. Beyond  the
broad respect and particular rights due to the
generalized other, there must be, asserts Ben-
habib, a recognition of those entailments due to
the concrete or specific “other.” That recognition,
in turn, requires the skills of contextual judgment
(p. 53), skills that rest upon a sensitivity to the
particular—a sensitivity that good historical and
geographical explanation can advance. Empathy
can allow us to imagine when we need to extend
the rights of the generalized “other” in any par-
ticular context, but empathy too readily erases
differences. Only the voice of the other can ade-
quately alert us to plurality and difference. Histo-
rians of subjugated ethnic groups and of women
have persistently made this point and, as Limerick
explicitly concedes, have made possible the new
syntheses through which the New Western His-
torians have confronted some of the central
myths of Anglo-American identities. If historical
and geographical writings can build on this work
of the New Western Historians and continue to
attend to the sets of agenda of those groups in
subjugated positions, then the circle  between
facts and values will indeed have turned virtuous.
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Notes
1. In this paper, I shall take up the first set of criti-
cisms in some detail but shall say less about the
second. The very possibility of the virtuous circle
of facts and values that I describe is denied by the
more radical versions of postmodernism. The po-
sition implicit in my remarks here might perhaps
be termed neopragmatic. In general terms, I am
something of a falsificationist, although in practi-
cal terms, the verifactionist calls the glass half full,
whereas the falsificationist says it is half empty. I
believe that value positions rely upon making
claims about the consequences of certain actions
based upon conclusions drawn from observations
of similar actions in other contexts. These obser-
vations are subject to empirical falsification, and
the conclusions drawn from them are subject to
objection on grounds of logic or plausibility. I
develop this point a little more fully in the con-
clusion.
2. White (1994b) describes the Roosevelt position
as Buffalo Bill Cody’s, and sees a complementary
tension between Turner and Buffalo Bill. Between
them, the arguments of Cody (or Roosevelt) and
Turner prefigure the whole discussion of the fron-
tier in this century. Regardless of precedence, the
central point still stands that the two positions
construct different stories from different points of
view.
3. Merchant (1989) is among the many historians
who share this view of the development of the U.S.
as essentially a frontier process. Indeed her two
ecological revolutions, the colonial and the capi-
talist, succeed each other in each place as the
frontier moves westwards. In her terms, Cronon’s
Changes in the Land is essentially about the colo-
nial ecological revolution, whereas his Nature’s
Metropolis is essentially about the capitalist eco-
logical revolution.
4. Marx would not have used the term “utopia” in
the way I do here, for it was precisely the implau-
sibility of the dreams of some socialists that led
him to distinguish their “utopian” approach from
one such as his own that was grounded in the
material tendencies/possibilities of the contempo-
rary age and thus perhaps deserved the term “sci-
entific.” In commenting on Bakunin’s attack on
his work, Marx noted that the phrase “scientific
socialism” was “only used in opposition to utopian
socialism, which wants to attach the people to
new delusions, instead of limiting its science to the
knowledge of the social movement made by the
people itself” (1974b  [1874–75]:337). Engels,
from Socialism: Utopian and Scientific (1993
[1880]) onwards, made explicit use of this distinc-
tion. I want to retain the term utopian, however,
to describe the imagined future world that helps
us to think critically about our own times. I also
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use it to stress the degree of choice involved in
normative issues so that we avoid the implication
that a better future is somehow inevitable.
5. Even here, I am disturbed by the dogmatism and
disciplinary chauvinism of some of Cronon’s crit-
ics in geography. To suggest that if Cronon had
written about a later period, he would not have
been able to avoid issues raised by Chicago’s tran-
sition to an industrial economy, seems to me to be
beside the point (Pudup 1994). Page and Walker’s
attempt to correct Cronon’s “unsustainable as-
sumptions about the  primacy of  intraregional
trade” by asserting that “[t]his point was made
definitively by geographers decades ago”
(1994:153; referring, I suppose, to the work of
Allan Pred) ignores the work in economic history
that has at least kept the question open (e.g.,
Lindstrom and Sharpless 1978).
6. In  recognizing  the links  between questions of
strategy and those of truth, I do not want to allow
the one to be collapsed into the other. This is what
Demeritt proposes in his “politics of truth,” sug-
gesting that we need “to evaluate competing ac-
counts, not in terms of their truth or falsehood,
but in terms of their likelihood to produce the kind
of world we hope to live in and leave behind us”
(Demeritt 1994a:31,34). Drawing on Wolff and
Resnick’s work, Graham makes much the same
case for Marxist economic geography (Wolff and
Resnick 1987; Graham 1990). Yet discourse, it
seems to me, should only strive to produce a better
world by persuading people of the truth claims it
makes. As Cronon replies to Demeritt: “Without
some faith that our descriptions of reality bear at
least  tangential  relationship to that reality, it
makes little sense to worry about reality at all”
(1994b:42).
I am not willing to allow that the distinctiveness
of Cronon’s position is purely metaphorical. I find
much of value in Demeritt’s account (1994b) of
the consequences of various metaphors of nature
in the work of Cronon and, particularly, of Wor-
ster. Demeritt suggests that there are ontological
and epistemological chasms between the environ-
mental historians’ metaphor of nature as an active
agent and the new cultural geographers’ metaphor
of landscape as text. The two positions see differ-
ent things and accept different procedures of ex-
emplification and verification. This particular
distance may well be reduced by searching for a
common metaphorical ground, one that Demeritt
believes can be taken from the work of Bruno
Latour and Donna Haraway, where he finds “a
new language to describe nature as both a real
actor in human history and as a socially con-
structed object of these histories” (1994b:179).
Demeritt claims to show that Cronon’s treatment
of ecology as not simply a metaphor but an objec-
tive account of first nature, illustrates the dangers
Haraway finds in naïve realism. Yet, as Demeritt
notes also (1994b:181), Haraway is equally harsh
about naïve relativism, dismissing both realism
and relativism as “god-tricks” (1991:191).
To abandon Truth with a capital “T” still leaves
one with the truth claims of “partial perspectives”
to be evaluated on the basis of “shared conversa-
tions in epistemology”. Taking up the invitation
implicit in the “cyborg vision”, we can explore
further a shared conversation between Marx and
Cronon about the nature of the colonial Ameri-
can economy. We might talk about the knowledge
they articulate and not only about the different
situations from which they speak.
7. There are, of course, alternatives to both Cronon
and Marx. Two recent studies of the transforma-
tion of the colonial and postcolonial agrarian of
New England illustrate the same issues about the
interplay between norms and narratives. Mer-
chant (1989) emphasizes  the relationship be-
tween changing ideas about the place of women
in nature, on one hand, and changing systems of
property relations on the other. Proletarianization,
for Merchant, is a response to the inherent con-
tradictions of this new ideological and legal order.
In contrast to the socialist feminism of Merchant,
Rothenberg (1992) advocates on behalf of the
productivity  gains  achievable under  a market
economy. Merchant sees a better future in the
supercession of “[p]atriarchy, capitalism, and the
domination of nature” (1989:270), whereas
Rothenberg holds up the success of capitalist ag-
riculture in postcolonial New England as a posi-
tive example of the benefits of market relations,
an example, she is happy to find, many formerly
socialist countries now following.
8. Since I am critical of what I see as the central
normative concerns in Worster’s work, I should
immediately add that I think his politics lead him
more frequently to overstatement than misstate-
ment, although examples of the latter can be
found. Furthermore, not all his work is consistent
with what might be termed his central line of
reasoning. He has expressed doubts himself about
his ecological model (1993b) and has developed
a much more nuanced argument about the role of
culture in some places (see, especially, 1992d).
9. I owe this observation to Bill Cronon.
10. Rose (1991:120), in reviewing The Condition of
Postmodernity, criticizes Harvey’s “constant paren-
thetic incantation of ‘and women, blacks and
other oppressed groups.’ ” Examples of this inade-
quate parenthetical political correctness abound
in Philo and Kearns (1992).
11. Now, however,  Limerick  seems  less confident
about the possibility of regional identities and
shared regional pasts serving as a sort of social
glue: “Ten years ago, by sheer will, I was able to
see in region a form of loyalty and identification
that could cross over the barriers of race, ethnic-
ity, gender, and, most astonishing, class. Now I
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strain to see even the outlines of that vision of
union through region, or through anything else”
(1996:103–04).
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